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Author’s Note
by Diane Orentlicher

Shortly after this report was released, Serbia’s relationship with the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) achieved a milestone: On July 21, 2008, Serbian
authorities announced that they had arrested wartime Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić,
who had been living under an assumed identity in suburban Belgrade.1 Along with Ratko
Mladić, who is believed still to be hiding in Serbia, Karadžić was twice indicted on genocide
and other grave charges in 19952—and along with Mladić, had been a fugitive from justice
for thirteen years.
The fundamental fact of Karadžić’s impunity had persisted for so long that those who
had tirelessly sought his arrest were “in shock” when it finally happened.3 As news of the capture emerged, Bosnians told a colleague in Belgrade that “they cannot and dare not believe”
what they heard.4 What had long seemed unthinkable soon became historic fact: Radovan
Karadžić was transferred to the Netherlands on July 30, 2008,5 and made an initial court
appearance before the ICTY the next day.6
It was no coincidence that Karadžić was captured less than two weeks after a new
government took office in Belgrade—the leading party’s commitment to Serbia’s entry into
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the European Union (EU) is widely believed to have provided a crucial margin of victory in
parliamentary elections two months earlier—or that his arrest followed the replacement of the
longtime head of Serbia’s security services with someone committed to the new government’s
pro-Europe platform. Understanding that the path to EU membership requires full cooperation with the ICTY, Serbia took a major step toward fulfilling its outstanding obligations to
the Tribunal.7
If Serbia’s changing political landscape provided the necessary context for Karadžić’s
capture, the manner in which his arrest transpired disclosed deeper changes in Serbia’s
response to the ICTY, now in existence fifteen years. Notably, upon his arrest Karadžić was
brought before Serbia’s War Crimes Chamber (WCC)—which began operating less than five
years ago and which, as this report chronicles, in myriad ways represents one of the most
tangible legacies of the ICTY in Serbia.8 The arrest was announced by Serbia’s War Crimes
Prosecutor, who—as described in this report and dramatically illustrated by the Karadžić capture—has developed a professional partnership with his counterparts in The Hague. And in
accordance with Serbian law, the WCC ruled that Karadžić could be transferred to the ICTY.
That a Serbian court cleared the legal path for Karadžić’s transfer to the ICTY stood
in sharp contrast to the circumstances surrounding the transfer of former Serbian president
Slobodan Milošević to The Hague seven years earlier. Then Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić
abruptly removed Milošević from Serbia in defiance of the country’s constitutional court and
in the face of then President Vojislav Koštunica’s strong opposition.9 This time, the arrest
of a notorious fugitive took place through, not in defiance of, Serbian judicial process, highlighting significant if incomplete progress in Serbia’s capacity to reckon legally with Serbian
war crimes.
Announcing the arrest in The Hague, ICTY Prosecutor Serge Brammertz said: “This
is a very important day for the victims who have waited for this arrest for over a decade. It is
also an important day for international justice because it clearly demonstrates that nobody is
beyond the reach of the law and that sooner or later all fugitives will be brought to justice.”10
Notably, too, Brammertz hailed the achievement of the ICTY’s “colleagues in Belgrade,”
including Serbia’s own War Crimes Prosecutor.
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THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY IN SERBIA

Foreword
by Aryeh Neier

In the fifteen years since the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the movement to do justice internationally after terrible crimes has
made great advances. The only other period in which there were comparable advances was in
the immediate aftermath of the unprecedented crimes of World War II. Those atrocities led
to the formation of international criminal tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, development of
the concept of crimes against humanity, and adoption of the Genocide Convention of 1948 and
the Geneva Conventions of 1949. In that era, however, progress soon came to a halt because of
the onset of the Cold War. In our time, it seems possible that the advances of the past fifteen
years will continue in the years ahead. If that happens, the first half of the twenty first century
may not be so blood-drenched as the awful last half of the twentieth century.
Up to now, however, the actual information available to us on the impact of international
justice has been scant. We know that more than 250 individuals from some ten countries,
most of them high-ranking, have been indicted by the various international criminal tribunals. A significant majority have been apprehended and tried, and a large number have been
convicted and are now serving prison sentences. We also know that national justice systems
have been affected by the development of international justice, both in their incorporation of
advances in international criminal law and in their readiness to hold accountable high officials
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who .fall within their jurisdiction and who are accused of committing heinous crimes. In many
instances, former officials who long enjoyed impunity have recently been brought to justice,
or are now being brought to justice, before national tribunals. This is a remarkable, though
as yet little noted, consequence of the development of international justice.
What has been lacking up to now, however, is systematic information and analysis of
the effects of international justice in a country that has been the focus of attempts to hold
accountable those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. How
is the effort to do justice seen in that country? What has changed as a consequence of that
effort? What are its strengths and what are its shortcomings?
These are questions that are addressed in Diane Orentlicher’s careful and penetrating
study of the impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Serbia.
Orentlicher has been a leading scholar and practitioner in the field of international justice
since the establishment of the ICTY fifteen years ago and, indeed, was one of those whose earlier thinking and writing about accountability for past abuses formed part of the background
for the establishment of the ICTY. The Open Society Justice Initiative is pleased to have the
opportunity to sponsor Orentlicher’s research and to publish this ground-breaking study that
is a product of that research.

Aryeh Neier
President, Open Society Institute
Chairman, Open Society Justice Initiative
April 28, 2008
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FOREWORD

I. Introduction and Summary
Fifteen years ago the United Nations Security Council launched the contemporary era of war
crimes tribunals by establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY). At the time, ethnic violence was in full rage in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the daily media
were broadcasting real-time images of what were commonly called “the worst atrocities in
Europe since World War II.” In this setting, the Security Council’s action struck many as desperate, ad hoc and inadequate: Unwilling to take more assertive action to stop ethnic violence
in its tracks, it seemed, the Security Council salved its conscience by creating a court.11
Yet despite its inauspicious origin, the ICTY inspired widespread hope and commitment among those who believed it could partially redeem the world’s failure to prevent ethnic
carnage in Europe’s heart. If the circumstances leading to the ICTY’s creation induced some
measure of skepticism, the Tribunal nonetheless seemed importantly worthwhile in its own
right: Its work could answer the vicious violence euphemistically known as “ethnic cleansing”
with an authoritative legal reckoning. Authors of mass atrocities would be held to account
after all, the ICTY might even deter further crimes in the Balkans,12 and its operation would
send a message to the future that if such crimes occurred again, those responsible would be
brought before the bar of justice.
Internationally, the commitment the ICTY inspired proved to be both wide and deep:
What had long seemed implausible—a revival of Nuremberg-type tribunals—soon became a
normal though hardly routine response to atrocious crimes. Since 1994 the United Nations
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has created or jointly established international courts to address crimes committed in Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, Cambodia and Lebanon. In 2002, a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) began operating; by March 2008, 105 States had become parties
to its governing statute.
If these developments signify a deepening commitment to international criminal tribunals, there is also growing debate about their effectiveness. Some wonder whether international tribunals have achieved the goals their supporters thought they would achieve; others
question their costs.13 Yet with few exceptions,14 there has been scant effort to assess their
actual impact beyond their widely-acknowledged and considerable contribution in clarifying
the contours of international criminal law.15 Too often, public debate about the accomplishments of international tribunals has been driven by untested assumptions.
In this setting, the Open Society Justice Initiative believes it important that those
involved in the work of international tribunals—whether as practitioners, donors, policy-makers or in other capacities—develop a greater understanding of the impact contemporary war
crimes tribunals have had in the regions directly affected by their work. We hope that this
report contributes useful insights in this regard and helps stimulate further inquiries into the
impact of international tribunals in the countries most affected by their work.
We decided to focus initially on the ICTY for two principal reasons. First, it has operated
longer than any other international criminal court and thus has a comparatively rich record
of experience.16 The second reason follows from our awareness that the impact of any international court is highly context-specific, making it perilous to draw broad conclusions about
the impact of international criminal tribunals from the experience of any one court. In light of
this and of the fact that the ICTY has jurisdiction over crimes committed in several countries
(those formerly Yugoslav republics),17 examining the ICTY’s impact would enable us to avoid
the potentially distorting effect of studying a single-country court, such as the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda or the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
This report sets forth our findings about the ICTY’s impact in Serbia; later reports will
address its impact in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

The ICTY and Serbia
How a society responds to the work of an international tribunal is a function of myriad variables, which include but are scarcely limited to the court’s judicial performance. As one writer
has noted, “[t]he way people and governments deal with the past,” including past atrocities
prosecuted by an international tribunal, “is highly dependent on their particular context.”18
Assessing an international court’s impact is thus to some extent a matter of assessing how
well the institution has met the challenges presented by each “particular context” in which its
work is relevant.
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When it comes to Serbia, the ICTY has faced the peculiar challenge presented by a
country whose political culture has in recent years been profoundly influenced by nationalist
leaders who are opposed to its work and who have publicly cast the court as an anti-Serb instrument of Western power. For the first seven years of the Tribunal’s life, the Federal Republic
of Serbia was led by a man, Slobodan Milošević, who would later face trial for his role in
fomenting the violence that consumed the Balkans in the 1990s. Not surprisingly, Milošević’s
Serbia was unremittingly hostile to the ICTY, and Serbian citizens were served a steady diet
of anti-Hague vitriol.
Milošević’s immediate successor, Vojislav Koštunica,19 carried forward an anti-Hague
stance and has found broad support in a populace among whom nationalists remain a potent
political force. This is hardly the whole picture: the post-Milošević political landscape includes
reformist leaders who support ICTY cooperation and have ensured substantial progress in this
regard. But full cooperation remains stymied.20
Further compounding the ICTY’s challenge in Serbia, the country was largely spared
direct experience of the violence giving rise to prosecutions in The Hague.21 As a Serbian
journalist emphasized in an interview, “What is important for understanding [Serbia’s attitude
toward the ICTY], we don’t have victims, only refugees. Serbians don’t know what it’s like to
be victims.”22
A minority of Serbian citizens is, nonetheless, devoted to ensuring justice for those who
endured atrocities during the 1990s wars. None of them believes that the ICTY bears sole or
even principal responsibility for ensuring justice and none believes that the Hague Tribunal’s
performance has been flawless. These citizens have, however, championed Serbian cooperation with the ICTY, often at personal risk. Their reasons vary—we explore them in Chapter
II—but they sift down to the principled position that Serbian citizens must acknowledge that
terrible crimes were committed in their name and were not justified. Without the ICTY, they
believe, Serbia would not have confronted its leaders’ responsibility for the horrific crimes
that engulfed the Balkans in the 1990s. With the ICTY, some measure of accountability has
been assured.

Impact: Defining and Assessing
To assess the impact of the ICTY it was of course necessary first to identify relevant types
of impact that would be the subject of our inquiry. As summarized below, we identified
several categories of impact that would guide our inquiry in Serbia and elsewhere in the
former Yugoslavia, which reflect both the original justifications for the ICTY’s creation and
goals commonly assigned to the Tribunal by supporters of international justice and by the
Tribunal itself.
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Impact on Victims
Public assessments of war crimes tribunals have rarely or only superficially examined the
question, what impact does their operation have on victims?23 Yet victims are one of the most
important constituencies for international criminal courts.24 Although often overlooked by
others, the Security Council implicitly recognized this when it established the ICTY, reasoning
that the Tribunal’s work would help ensure that atrocious crimes were not only “halted” but
also “effectively redressed.”25
With the exception of one trial now under way in The Hague, however, none of the
ICTY’s cases has involved crimes occurring in Serbia proper.26 Because this report examines the impact of the ICTY in Serbia, it touches only briefly and indirectly on the Tribunal’s
impact on victims.
Yet this should not obscure the importance of the Tribunal to those who have endured
crimes most of us can hardly bear even to imagine. Our research in Bosnia, which will be
the subject of a separate report, makes clear that the ICTY has mattered greatly to many Bosniaks—who endured the largest number of crimes charged by the ICTY Prosecutor—even as
the Tribunal has disappointed their expectations. While many of the Tribunal’s sentences have
struck Bosniaks as derisorily short, some judgments have provided a sense of justice not readily captured or commonly reflected in assessments of the Tribunal. For example, many Sarajevans were gratified by a November 2006 Appeals Chamber judgment imposing a sentence
of life imprisonment on a defendant, Stanislav Galić, for his role in the siege of Sarajevo;27 in
their view, the judgment honored their suffering and helped restore a moral balance that had
been frightfully put awry.
Many Bosniaks felt a similar sense of vindication by the ICTY’s determination in an
earlier case that the July 1995 massacre by Serbian forces of Muslim men in Srebrenica was
a genocide.28 As one Bosniak told us (and as many said in similar terms), the ICTY’s “finding that what happened at Srebrenica was genocide is the most important achievement and
without the ICTY this would not be possible.”29 Conversely, the Tribunal’s failure to conclude
that genocide occurred elsewhere in Bosnia is cause for disappointment among many victims.
And while it is often noted that many victims have had a hard time letting go of their grief,
the ICTY’s work has also helped empower some of these same victims. One of our Bosnian
interlocutors noted, for example, that “ICTY judgments created a new kind of awareness that
women had been used as a means of war. They became visible, personalized, and recognized
as one kind of victim. This enabled them to become more active”30 in such matters as exercising their rights to obtain civil benefits.
Yet however important, the justice some victims have found in The Hague risks being
overwhelmed by one monumental failure: the two men who together personify Bosniaks’ suffering—Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić—remain at large thirteen years after they were
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twice indicted on genocide charges. One of our interlocutors in Sarajevo summed up what
we heard from many in Bosnia: The ICTY has done “so many good things but they’re in the
shadow of Karadžić and Mladić.” Because these two suspects have eluded justice for so long,
she said, “many ordinary people [in Bosnia] can’t see the good things the ICTY has done.”31
If the impunity of Karadžić and Mladić has radically diminished the ICTY’s positive
impact on victims in Bosnia, the two fugitives occupy a different role in our assessment of
ICTY impact in Serbia. Serbia is known to have provided shelter to both men and is believed
to be providing ongoing protection to Mladić—a continuing violation of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in the judgment of the International
Court of Justice.32 As we elaborate in Chapter II, Serbia’s continuing protection of Mladić is
both a barometer of its democratic maturity and an impediment to its full integration into a
global community to which most Serbian citizens want to belong.

Impact on Perpetrators: Deterrence
It is widely thought that a key measure of an international court’s effectiveness is its impact
on perpetrators. This broad category of impact can take several forms, of which the most
obvious is a court’s deterrent effect. As noted earlier, halting further atrocities in the former Yugoslavia was a key justifying aim behind the Security Council’s decision to create the
ICTY. As the ICTY’s then president noted in the Tribunal’s first annual report to the UN
Security Council,
One of the main aims of the Security Council [in establishing the ICTY] was to establish
a judicial process capable of dissuading the parties to the conflict from perpetrating
further crimes. It was hoped that, by bringing to justice those accused of massacres
and similar egregious violations of international humanitarian law, both belligerents
and civilians would be discouraged from committing further atrocities. In short, the
Tribunal is intended to act as a powerful deterrent to all parties against continued participation in inhuman acts.33
Those who have championed international war crimes courts hope, more broadly, that
their operation will deter future atrocities outside the particular context in which particular
tribunals were established.34
Although we sought out information that might shed light on the questions of whether
or to what extent the Tribunal has achieved its deterrent aims, we ultimately did not believe
we could reach significant conclusions based upon the evidence available to us at this time.
A number of our Serbian interlocutors as well as other sources are convinced that the ICTY
has had a significant deterrent effect. But these views—typically grounded in anecdotal evi-

SHRINKING THE SPACE FOR DENIAL

15

dence—did not provide an adequate basis for even provisional conclusions. Accordingly, with
the exception of our brief observations here, this report does not address the deterrent impact
of the ICTY except indirectly through its discussion of various ways in which the Tribunal’s
operation has contributed to strengthening Serbia’s capacity to prosecute war crimes domestically and, more broadly, dispelling a culture of impunity.
While we do not believe that we can reach reliable conclusions about the ICTY’s general deterrent impact, we know some things with sobering certainty: As has often been noted,
the creation of the ICTY did not by itself end atrocities in the Balkans. The 1995 genocide in
Srebrenica occurred two years after the ICTY was created, while atrocities in Kosovo surged
during 1998–99.
By equal measure, however, we do not believe that the occurrence of atrocious crimes
after the ICTY’s creation closes the book, as some suggest, on the question whether international tribunals can exert a deterrent impact or even whether the ICTY has deterred some
crimes that would have been committed but for its operation.35 The July 1995 genocide in
Srebrenica occurred at a time when the ICTY was in its institutional infancy—its Prosecutor
had by then indicted only fourteen suspects36—and, more important, at a time when the ICTY
was frustrated in its ability to secure custody of those whom its Prosecutor had indicted.37 By
the time the Srebrenica genocide occurred the ICTY had only one suspect, a low-level camp
guard named Dušan Tadić, in its custody.38 Perhaps as important, the ICTY had gained custody
of Tadić from Germany—a circumstance that provided little cause for those in the former
Yugoslavia to fear arrest as long as they remained in the Balkans.
The situation had improved, but not nearly enough, by the time abuses in Kosovo intensified in 1998–99. In the ICTY’s annual report to the Security Council in 1997, then President
Cassese noted that the Tribunal’s mandate of “putting an end” to international crimes “has not
yet been properly fulfilled because the vast majority of persons indicted by the Tribunal are still
at liberty, ignoring their indictments with seeming impunity.”39 Two years later, the Tribunal’s
annual report, which covered the period in which abuses in Kosovo reached their zenith, noted
that 35 of the Tribunal’s publicly indicted suspects were still at large;40 these included Ratko
Mladić and Radovan Karadžić, by then twice indicted on genocide and other charges.
Those inclined to believe that the ICTY has had some deterrent impact note that the
Balkans region has not seen further atrocities comparable to those committed in Kosovo since
the arrest of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević even though Serbia has seen further territorial defections—the context in which mass atrocities occurred in the 1990s—in that
period. In recent years, Montenegro separated from Serbia peacefully, while Kosovo’s February
2008 declaration of independence has not provoked massive violence despite Serbians’ intense
attachment to Kosovo and their leaders’ strong opposition to its secession.41 But while it may be
tempting to conclude that this demonstrates the deterrent force of a court that finally proved
its capacity to bring high-level perpetrators to book, the factors contributing to recent patterns
are too complex to admit of any facile conclusions.42
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.
Impact
on Perpetrators: Removal from Serbian Politics
If the ICTY’s deterrent effect is unknown, other aspects of its impact in respect of perpetrators are clear: In the words of Serbian journalist Dejan Anastasijević, the ICTY has at the least
succeeded in “physically removing some of the worst criminals”43 from the region. Describing
this as an important role of the Tribunal “that is usually neglected by experts,” Anastasijević
observed that, when it came to Serbian leaders who were transferred to The Hague, including
former President Slobodan Milošević: “It was good not to have them around, at all levels.”44
Serbians committed to democratic progress believe that the ICTY’s ability to prosecute
Milošević in particular was crucial in facilitating Serbia’s transition to a democratically-elected
government. From the vantage point of the post-Milošević government, according to a former
official who served in that administration, the “removal of Milošević was something that had to
be done in order to make the next step in our democratization process. He would have been an
unbearable burden [if he were tried] in Serbian jurisdiction.”45 Serbian journalist Filip Svarm
concurs and goes further: If the country’s leading war criminals had not been prosecuted,
Svarm believes, “we would have had a mafia oligarchy as our leaders.”46
This is not to say that, with Milošević and other senior suspects removed from the political scene, Serbia has evolved into a vibrant democracy. Illiberal nationalists continue to play a
prominent and toxic role in Serbian politics.

Doing Justice; Dispelling Impunity
Among the various objectives mentioned in the Security Council resolution establishing the
ICTY, one stands out for its stark simplicity: a key aim of the ICTY was to “bring to justice the
persons who are responsible” for serious violations of international humanitarian law then
under way.47 Reading the 1993 resolution, it is easy to collapse this aim into the Security Council’s broader objectives—halting further atrocities, providing effective redress and, most ambitiously, contributing to the restoration and maintenance of peace.48 Yet for Serbian citizens
who support the ICTY interviewed for this report, ensuring prosecution of those responsible
for atrocities committed in the 1990s is one of the central goals the ICTY should achieve.
While their explanations vary, our interlocutors in Serbia who pressed this point tended
to emphasize the broadly corrosive effects of failing to ensure justice—and have little doubt
that there would have been wholesale impunity without the ICTY. In the words of Serbian
journalist Filip Svarm: “It’s simple. If not for the Hague Tribunal, no one would ever actually
bring to trial anyone who committed these crimes.”49 And, as Serbian human rights lawyer
Bogdan Ivanišević observed, “the message [would have been that] one can do whatever he
wants to do because he’s in power and that’s it. That kind of message would be disastrous. The
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ICTY prevented that from happening.”50 In the view of human rights advocate Andrej Nosov,
by prosecuting Slobodan Milošević in particular, the Hague Tribunal demonstrated that “there
is no one who can order killings and stay unpunished.”51
Yet none of our interlocutors came close to suggesting that the Tribunal has achieved an
unqualified success in combating impunity in Serbia. With security forces largely unreformed,
Serbia still remains stalled in the early stages of political transition.

Educative Function: “Addressing the Past”
Many Serbians who support the ICTY believe that one of the most important benchmarks
of success for the Tribunal is educating the Serbian public about atrocities—especially about
crimes committed by their political leaders.52 As Ana Miljanić put it, the Tribunal would achieve
a significant measure of success if “people remember over time things that were brought into
public knowledge by the ICTY’s work.”53 Accepting the facts established in The Hague is
important, Serbian supporters of the ICTY believe, because this is a first step toward acknowledging Serbian responsibility for atrocious crimes and unequivocally condemning them.
By this measure, the ICTY has not yet achieved major success, although it has laid
the foundation for broader acceptance in the future of crimes committed by Serbian leaders.
Public opinion polls taken in recent years indicate that a large proportion of Serbian citizens
either have not yet been persuaded that Serbs committed a majority of the atrocities that
accompanied the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s or are unwilling to acknowledge what
they know.54
We do not believe that the data currently available enable us to draw reliable conclusions about the underlying reasons for these results but note several possibilities that may
play a contributing part. One is that widespread mistrust of the ICTY among Serbian citizens
has undermined the Tribunal’s ability to serve an educative role in Serbia. Many Serbians see
the ICTY as fundamentally “an instrument of [anti-Serb] power”55 rather than as an impartial
court of justice. Although many Serbians polled in recent years say they know little about the
ICTY, roughly two-thirds perceive it as biased against Serbs. In this, they are following the
lead of Serbian politicians who have demonized the ICTY, starting with Slobodan Milošević
and continuing with the now-caretaker prime minister, Vojislav Koštunica.
Even those leaders who support Serbian cooperation with the ICTY have for the most
part framed their position in pragmatic rather than principled terms: Full cooperation is
the entry price for admission to the European Union, they argue. Only a small minority of
political figures has advanced the case that Serbia should cooperate for moral rather than
expedient reasons.
Other factors doubtless reinforce a persistent “culture of denial.”56 “When you have a
brother or a husband” who participated in conflicts in which atrocities occurred, “you don’t
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think of him as someone who could take a knife to a child,” Jadranka Jelinčić suggested. “For
very personal reasons you can’t change the framework in which you think.”57
Similar sentiments may lead some Serbian respondents who participate in opinion
polls to deny or downplay their actual beliefs. Vojin Dimitrijević, whose Belgrade Centre for
Human Rights co-sponsored several of the surveys we describe in this report, makes the point
this way: “The question is whether you really don’t know or you refuse to know.”58 In the view
of Serbian attorney Ivan Janković, when it comes to crimes of great magnitude, most people
cannot help but know what happened but “often deny their knowledge.”59
With others, Janković nonetheless believes that evidence adduced in The Hague has
significantly “shrunk the public space”60 in which political leaders can credibly deny key facts
about notorious atrocities. For a long time, nationalist figures claimed that the number of
people killed in Srebrenica in July 1995 was much lower than the real figure while blaming
many of the killings on intra-Muslim violence. “Now,” as Bogdan Ivanišević notes, “people who
say that are from the margins.... There is incomparably less distortion of the past.”61
In the view of journalist Ljiljana Smajlović, “There’s no question that the ICTY has educated the public; we’ve found out more about war crimes and the ... inner workings of the government than we would ever have found out—and about the criminal aspects of the regime.”62
She believes that the “findings of the Tribunal are more accepted now” than during earlier
periods; as a result of “what we’ve found out in The Hague,” she says, the public now “accepts
that Serbs committed enormous crimes,” including the Srebrenica massacre. Jadranka Jelinčić
makes much the same point: “It’s now very difficult to deny that certain things happened and
that cultural elites were responsible.”63 Still, Jelinčić notes, this knowledge “doesn’t necessarily
make people regret” crimes they can no longer credibly deny.64

Impact on the Rule of Law: Domestic War Crimes
Prosecutions
A central premise behind the ICTY’s creation was that local courts in the former Yugoslavia
were unable or could not be trusted to bring perpetrators of atrocities to justice—in the case
of Serbia, in large part because crimes perpetrated or authored by Serbs were abetted by
wholesale impunity.65 And so it comes as something of a surprise that one of the ICTY’s most
tangible achievements in Serbia has been its role in spurring the creation of a local war crimes
court and helping empower that court to function professionally.
In July 2003 the Serbian parliament enacted legislation establishing the War Crimes
Chamber (WCC), a specialized component of the Belgrade District Court with jurisdiction
over several international offenses, including those committed to the jurisdiction of the ICTY.
Everyone we interviewed in Serbia believes that such a court could not have functioned in
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Serbia until the political transition following the fall of Milošević—and most believe that the
WCC would not exist but for the ICTY, “at least not at this point.”66
Although the ICTY did not play a direct role in creating the Serbian WCC, the reformist
wing of the first post-Milošević government saw the Hague Tribunal, in the words of a member
of that government, as “very useful” in helping create the political space for Serbia to deal with
“the burden of war crimes in all its dimensions.”67 A spokesman for the Serbian War Crimes
Prosecutor likewise believes that the ICTY paved the way for the WCC. In his words, “the
Hague Tribunal was the necessity of the moment” during the Milošević era, because there was
no will to prosecute war crimes in Serbian courts. “I do believe,” he continued, “it was exactly
through the Hague Tribunal that the process of facing the past was initiated in the states of
the former Yugoslavia.”68
In other, less obvious, ways the ICTY provided further incentives for Serbia to establish
a credible war crimes court. In late August 2003 the UN Security Council endorsed a “completion strategy” proposed by the ICTY President in 2002, pursuant to which the Tribunal would
gradually wind down its operations so that it could complete its work in 2010.69 To meet this
deadline, the ICTY would have to transfer cases involving comparatively low-level perpetrators
to national courts. National courts, in turn, would have to meet basic standards of fair process
to be eligible to receive cases transferred from The Hague. In this setting, the Serbian government—which had long argued that Serbian suspects should be tried in Serbia—had a strong
incentive to establish a credible war crimes court.
Once the WCC began operating, the ICTY provided further incentive for the Serbian
court to operate in a professional fashion. While genuinely troubled by many Serbians’ treatment of Serbian war criminals as national heroes, the Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor, Vladimir Vukčević, also wanted “to show that local courts can handle these cases.”70 In his view,
the fact that Serbian defendants were being tried before an international court represented a
harsh judgment of Serbian justice. For Vukčević and other Serbian officials, demonstrating
local competence was a matter of professional and national pride.
Since its creation, the WCC has been bolstered by the ICTY in various ways. Crucially,
when the ICTY transfers cases to Serbia it provides what one informed observer described as
“a wealth of evidence,” and this proved crucial to the WCC’s early progress.71 ICTY officials
have, moreover, helped train war crimes prosecutors, judges and staff and have in various ways
transferred “know how,” in the words of WCC President Siniša Važić.72
Beyond the direct transfer of expertise and evidence from The Hague to Belgrade, several of our Serbian interlocutors believe that the ICTY has provided Serbian courts an inspirational model of fair process. Although critical of the ICTY in many respects, journalist Ljiljana
Smajlović believes that the Tribunal has “taught the public what defendants are entitled to
[and] this is a positive impact.”73
None of this is to say that the ICTY helped launch a court that embodies an institutional
triumph over entrenched impunity. From its inception, the WCC has been unable to tackle
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high-level suspects—a significant shortcoming that its officials acknowledge. Moreover an
April 2007 trial judgment in a closely-watched case evinced a judicial determination to obscure
Serbian responsibility for an execution near Srebrenica in 1995, shattering the confidence
that local human rights organizations had until then placed in the court’s judges.74 Even
judgments that appear on the whole to be fair must run the gauntlet of review by a Supreme
Court chamber dominated by Milošević-era judges, which routinely finds fault with lower-level
verdicts. Like other dimensions of the ICTY’s impact in Serbia, then, the country’s process
of providing justice for 1990s-era atrocities is incomplete—yet nonetheless notable for the
progress achieved in recent years.

Reconciliation
Among the most contested issues in the field of transitional justice75 are whether prosecutions
should aspire to or can foster societal reconciliation in the aftermath of horrific crimes76—and
what reconciliation even means in this context. A variation on this theme has had some relevance for the ICTY, whose creation was justified in part on the premise that, “in the particular
circumstances of the former Yugoslavia,” the creation and operation of the Tribunal would not
only help “put an end” to the inter-ethnic crimes then under way but would also “contribute
to the restoration and maintenance of peace.”77
Going into this study, we did not expect our interlocutors in the Balkans to place much
store in this justification. Yet we found in both Serbia and Bosnia that some individuals who
support the ICTY place considerable weight on the role they believe an impartial legal reckoning can play in fostering long-term reconciliation, a term they appear to use principally
to connote an absence of future violence between national groups in the Balkans. Recalling
how former President Milošević and other nationalist leaders manipulated the past to foment
inter-ethnic violence in the 1990s, our Serbian interlocutors who pressed this point explain,
in the words of one analyst, that “if you don’t have justice, you can always manipulate the
past.... A lot of space is left for manipulation, [as happened] after the Second World War. You
have different historiographies.” But “once you have a sentence by a legal authority, you have
firm ground [ for discussion].”78
By its nature, the claim that ICTY prosecutions will serve the interests of long-term reconciliation cannot be tested now.79 But twentieth century Yugoslav history provides some basis
for this claim: Although Yugoslavia’s distinct ethnic groups committed mass atrocities against
each other during World War II, the country’s leader, Josip Broz Tito, “largely dispens[ed] with
war crimes trials like those the Allies convened at Nuremberg.”80 Against this background,
nationalist leaders in the former Yugoslavia were able to tap a deep reservoir of latent interethnic fear to foment violence during the 1990s.
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Performance-Related Factors
The ICTY’s ability to have a positive impact in Serbia has been profoundly constrained by factors beyond the court’s control, notably including the entrenched and vocal opposition of key
Serbian leaders and the enduring influence in Serbia of security forces implicated in 1990sera atrocities and of their political allies.81 But if the ICTY did not create these conditions, it is
necessary to ask whether it has done all that it could to minimize their harmful impact.
In the final chapter of this report we identify several factors within the control of the
ICTY and the states that support it that may have needlessly limited the Tribunal’s positive
achievements. To begin, the Tribunal as a whole has never placed adequate store in the importance of communicating effectively with the communities most affected by its work. A common challenge for the Tribunal throughout the Balkans is to ensure that its work is understood
in countries that are some 2,000 kilometers away from its seat in The Hague. Remarkably, the
ICTY did not even translate its judgments into the languages spoken in the former Yugoslavia
until 1999, and did not issue its first press release in Serbian until 2000. This left the field of
interpretative meaning to Slobodan Milošević and other anti-Hague nationalists for the first
crucial period of the Tribunal’s work.
The Tribunal belatedly established an outreach program in 1999 but, as a former outreach officer noted, “It is much more difficult to dismantle already established misperceptions
and propaganda than it would have been to start from the outset with updated and accurate
information about the Tribunal.”82 It is of course highly doubtful that the ICTY could have
overcome the distortions of its work put forth by the Milošević government in particular—but
it might have blunted their force, and a robust outreach effort may have been particularly
effective during the post-Milošević political transition.
The positive impact of the Tribunal has also been diminished by missteps in its performance as a judicial institution, some of which were especially pronounced in its earlier years.
Alongside factors that lie beyond the Tribunal’s control, poor case management and perhaps
overly ambitious indictments have contributed to lengthy delays between arrest and trial and
to unnecessarily protracted trials. (In recent years, however, the ICTY has made progress in
addressing some of these issues.) Moreover the failure of key ICTY staff and officials to educate themselves adequately about the Balkans has often been evident and deleterious.
That the ICTY’s famously long trial of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević
ended without judgment due to the defendant’s death came as a particularly harsh blow to
Serbian supporters of the tribunal, who had hoped that judgment in this case would play a
pivotal role in illuminating Serbian leaders’ and state institutions’ role in sponsoring 1990sera atrocities. With expectations high, the death of Milošević struck Serbian supporters of the
ICTY as “disastrous for the tribunal. Absolutely disastrous: It didn’t finish the job.”83
Even so, some evidence introduced in the Milošević case had a galvanizing impact on
Serbian opinion. In particular, a video of an execution near Srebrenica in 1995, which was
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shown during the Milošević trial and broadcast repeatedly on Serbian television, “ripped away
the veil of secrecy and denial of Serbian military operations in Bosnia during the 1992–95
war,” as the Washington Post reported.84 With the passage of time, other evidence introduced
into evidence during the marathon trial may find its way into the public space of acknowledgment and reckoning.

The Work of Generations
Fifteen years after the Security Council created the ICTY, there is a rich record for assessing the
Tribunal’s impact in the countries most affected by its work—and for identifying performancerelated factors that appear to have advanced the Tribunal’s goals or diminished its ability to
achieve them. And yet it is still too early to know the Tribunal’s long-term impact. This report
provides a snapshot of the ICTY’s impact to date, but it provides just that: As Germany’s experience after Nuremberg attests, the impact of an international criminal tribunal is the work of
generations, changing over time and in light of myriad mediating factors.
Indeed, even over the period covered by this report, the ICTY’s challenges, achievements and disappointments in Serbia have evolved significantly. This, itself, points to an
important “lesson learned” from the experience of the ICTY during its first fifteen years:
Recognizing that the circumstances giving rise to the creation of an international criminal
court inevitably change with the passage of time, those who bear principal responsibility for
developing tribunals’ policies would do well periodically to assess whether changing conditions
call for new strategies, such as pursuing greater engagement with local authorities aimed at
strengthening domestic capacity to prosecute war crimes.
By equal measure, on this fifteenth anniversary of the ICTY’s creation, it is useful to
keep sight of what has already been accomplished. Not least in the eyes of its supporters in
Serbia—“The Hague Tribunal demonstrated that not everything can be legalized.”85
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II. Serbia’s Relationship with
the ICTY
A. Introduction
Although two-thirds of the suspects indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have been ethnic Serbs,86 citizens of Serbia87 constitute a small fraction—only 13 percent—of the Tribunal’s indictees.88 Of those, all but one have faced charges
relating solely to crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and/or Kosovo.89
Thus, describing how many Serbians experienced the atrocities that have been prosecuted in
The Hague, one Serbian observer said: “It was all somehow out of Serbia.”90 (Like most of our
interlocutors in Serbia, this source did not include Kosovo when referring to Serbia.91)
Yet Serbian leaders played a central role in the violence that led to the ICTY’s creation,
and Serbia has been profoundly affected by the ICTY and the legacy of violence underlying its
prosecutions. At the time of his death in March 2006, the country’s former leader, Slobodan
Milošević, was on trial in The Hague on charges stemming from atrocities committed in
Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The Prosecutor’s case against Milošević in effect
placed the former Serbian leader at the epicenter of the violence that ravaged the former
Yugoslavia through much of the 1990s. While the Prosecutor sought to establish the criminal
responsibility of the defendant in the dock, evidence introduced during Milošević’s trial disclosed the broad structures of Belgrade’s support for Bosnian and Croatian Serb forces that
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committed atrocities during the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, respectively,
as well as institutional responsibility for atrocities committed by Serbian forces in Kosovo.92
Thus while Serbia was not on trial before the ICTY,93 the prosecution of Milošević illuminated
facts implicating the country’s political responsibility for the crimes charged against its former leader. Cases now under way in The Hague are likely to bring the relationship between
Belgrade and Serb forces in Bosnia and Croatia into even greater focus.94
Serbia’s relationship with other countries has, moreover, been defined in significant part
by its cooperation with the ICTY. Most important in recent years, the European Union (EU)
has linked Serbian membership in the Union to the transfer to The Hague of Ratko Mladić,95
a Bosnian Serb general who has been sought on genocide and other charges since 1995.96
Mladić is known to have lived in Serbia during much of the period since his indictment97
and drew a pension from the Yugoslav Army—approved in 2002 by then President (later
Prime Minister) Vojislav Koštunica—until December 2005.98 At least until recently, negotiations between the ICTY and Belgrade over the transfer of other Serbian suspects, including
Milošević, have been contentious even when they have ultimately led to the transfer or surrender of indictees to The Hague. So, too, have negotiations relating to documents sought by the
ICTY. While Serbia’s failure to meet its obligations to cooperate fully with the ICTY is hardly
the only impediment to its full acceptance in the international community, its importance in
Serbia’s relationship with Western countries inevitably shapes and complicates many Serbs’
attitudes toward the Tribunal and its work.
To the extent possible, we have tried to understand how this linkage has affected the
broader question of ICTY impact in Serbia. As we explain more fully below, in several respects
the linkage has had a direct and significant effect: It has provided crucial incentive for Serbia
to ensure that individuals indicted by the ICTY are transferred to its custody. Indeed, this
linkage has been the principal factor behind Serbian compliance with the ICTY. In the view of
Serbian citizens who support the ICTY, the transfer of indicted suspects to The Hague has had
broader salutary effects, among them removing dangerous individuals from Serbia’s political
scene and reaffirming core values that had been deformed under Milošević’s government. Others, however, worry whether Western countries’ seemingly endless demands for cooperation
with the Hague Tribunal have at times been counterproductive, providing a rallying issue for
ultra-nationalists99 and consuming too many of Serbia’s democratic energies.100 (Many Serbian
citizens, as we note later, do not blame the ICTY but instead government leaders for stoking the
anti-Hague sentiments of ultra-nationalists in the hope of securing their votes and, more generally, for keeping Serbia mired in unproductive battles rather than advancing its progress.)
In this setting, a background question shaping our understanding of what “ICTY
impact” means in the context of post-Milošević Serbia is: “How has Serbia’s relationship with
the ICTY affected the broader process of democratization in Serbia?” This is not to suggest
that promoting democracy is or should be a goal of international criminal tribunals except in
the important sense that promoting the rule of law is a cornerstone of democratic governance.
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But in the particular context of Serbia we thought it important to be attuned to the interaction
between the ICTY and Serbia’s process of democratization and stabilization. In particular,
we have sought to understand how developments in The Hague and in relation to the ICTY
affect the relative strength of ultra-nationalist sectors whose members support indicted and
convicted war criminals on the one hand and Serbia’s pro-reform sectors on the other hand.
Our analysis in this chapter reflects this concern when relevant, but is not driven by it.
As a foundation for our analysis of the ICTY’s impact in Serbia, we first provide a brief
overview of the Tribunal’s relationship with the country.

B. Overview of Serbia’s Relationship with the ICTY
Serbia’s relationship with the ICTY is considerably more complex than a casual consumer of
the daily media might guess, in large part because the country itself has gone through profound changes—not least including a radical diminution of its territory and population—since
the Tribunal was established. For present purposes, it is useful to divide that relationship into
two principal phases.
The first comprises the first seven years of the ICTY’s existence, when Slobodan
Milošević served as president of his ever-shrinking country or of its dominant republic.101 By
the time the UN Security Council resolved to establish the Tribunal in May 1993,102 the Yugoslav army and paramilitary forces had been involved in substantial wars in the former Yugoslav
republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, both of which were recognized as independent
states in 1992. The Security Council’s action in establishing the Tribunal was denounced by
Belgrade, which portrayed the ICTY as yet another anti-Serb measure by a world that had taken
the side of Serbia’s enemies in the conflicts of the early 1990s. Rejecting the ICTY’s legitimacy,
Milošević refused to cooperate with it.103
From the outset of the Tribunal’s existence and for the next seven years, Serbian citizens
were served a steady diet of anti-ICTY propaganda by their government. As journalist Mirko
Klarin has observed,
... one should not forget the fact that in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia up to 2000 the
power was held by individuals and political elites under investigation—and in the case
of Serbia under indictment—of The Hague prosecution. It is clear that it was not in
the least [in] their interest that the public in their countries gets the real picture of the
mission and functioning of the Tribunal. It should also not be forgotten that all the
time until 2000 the most influential media were under full control of editorial groups
which in the previous decade had been “outstanding” in the preparation of the ground
for war and war crimes, and afterwards in their justification or covering up in the name
of “higher” interests.104
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This period has had an enduring impact on Serbia’s relationship with the ICTY and on
Serbian citizens’ attitudes concerning accountability for atrocities committed by or with the
criminal participation of Serbian leaders and citizens.105 As many of our Serbian interlocutors emphasized, to the extent the ICTY’s work is meant to serve an educative function,106
its ability to do so is profoundly affected by the enduring effects of Milošević-era propaganda
casting Serbs as a threatened national group fighting for survival in the wars of the 1990s107
and, during the last seven years of his rule, as victims of what Milošević called the Tribunal’s
campaign of “genocide” against Serbs.108
The timing of the ICTY Prosecutor’s May 1999 indictment of Slobodan Milošević on
charges relating to Kosovo—issued when the war over Kosovo between the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and FRY was in full sway—made it easy for many Serbians to
believe what Milošević relentlessly claimed: that the ICTY was a tool of anti-Serb Western
powers or, as one observer put it, “an instrument of power.”109 (In fact, the principal factor
driving the immediate timing of the first Milošević indictment was then Prosecutor Louise
Arbour’s desire to help end Kosovo atrocities in “real time” and her concern that Milošević
would escape prosecution if she did not act quickly.)110 It was not until late 2001—substantially
after Milošević was indicted in 1999 on charges relating to events in Kosovo occurring that
same year—that the ICTY Prosecutor brought additional charges against Milošević relating to
crimes committed years earlier in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.111
Even Serbians who support the Tribunal point out that this sequence reinforces many
Serbians’ view that the ICTY is essentially a political institution. Why, after all, if the ICTY
Prosecutor had indictable evidence that Milošević bore criminal responsibility for atrocities
committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in the early to mid-1990s, was he not indicted
for those crimes until after his indictment for later crimes in Kosovo? As we elaborate later,
during his trial Milošević exploited the anti-Hague suspicions raised by this sequencing.
The second period dates from October 5, 2000, when Milošević stepped down from
the presidency in the face of massive protests after he challenged the results of a presidential election held on September 24, 2000, which Milošević lost. The democratically-elected
18-party coalition government that succeeded Milošević, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), was led by a strained alliance between Yugoslav president (later prime minister)
Vojislav Koštunica, a nationalist who has long seen the ICTY as an anti-Serb institution and an
infringement on Serbian sovereignty,112 and pro-Western Zoran Djindjić, who served as prime
minister of Serbia, the dominant republic of what then remained of Yugoslavia, from January
25, 2001 until his assassination in March 2003.113 As has often been noted, DOS’s unity in
seeking Milošević’s ouster masked vast differences within the coalition, including profoundly
different views concerning prosecution of war crimes. These differences became apparent
soon after DOS began governing.114
Although Djindjić will forever be remembered as the Serbian leader who transferred
Milošević to the ICTY in 2001, at first both leaders of the coalition government opposed doing
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so,115 instead preferring to try Milošević in local courts.116 But while Koštunica remained hostile
to the Tribunal, Djindjić became an advocate of surrendering Milošević.117 Faced with the prospect of losing U.S. direct aid as well as U.S. support for financing from international financial
institutions if Serbia did not surrender Milošević,118 even Koštunica reluctantly acquiesced in
certain government measures aimed at legalizing Milošević’s surrender on the ground that
this move would be a “lesser evil than what would happen to the country if we did not do it.”119
But Koštunica insisted that any transfer be undertaken in accordance with local law.120
In the lead-up to a conference of Western donors convened to help rebuild the former
Yugoslavia—and confronting a potential U.S. boycott of that conference121—the Yugoslav government began to lay the legal groundwork for transferring Milošević. In the meantime, the
former leader was arrested and charged under local law with corruption and abuse of power
on April 1, 2001. Not coincidentally, his arrest came one day after the congressionally-mandated deadline for certification by then-U.S. President Bill Clinton, as a pre-condition to the
release of funds appropriated for FRY, that FRY was cooperating with the ICTY and that it
had met several other criteria.122 Then, in late June 2001, as judges appointed by Milošević
to Yugoslavia’s Constitutional Court blocked a government decree authorizing Milošević’s
transfer to The Hague, Djindjić repudiated the court’s action123 and arranged for Milošević’s
transfer to The Hague without informing Koštunica.124 Immediately after the transfer, Serbia
was rewarded with a pledge of $1.28 billion at the conference of Western donors.125
In the prevailing political environment Djindjić apparently did not believe it prudent
to justify his action by appealing to principles of justice.126 Instead, he sought to rally public
support on pragmatic grounds—surrendering Milošević was the key to Serbia’s economic
prosperity and integration in the West. “Our country’s place is in the international community,” Djindjić said following Milošević’s transfer to The Hague. The government’s action, he
explained, was taken “not because of us or our parents but because of our children.”127
Years later, Serbian citizens and others who support the work of the ICTY frequently mention Djindjić’s reliance on pragmatic rather than moral arguments for transferring Milošević
to The Hague to illustrate the barriers that must be surmounted in securing Serbian support
for the process of reckoning under way in The Hague. In the view of many Serbians who
support prosecutions (and who for that reason support cooperation with the ICTY), Djindjić
went as far as was politically possible in the way he chose to justify his already controversial
step. In their opinion, the fact that even Djindjić did not make a moral case for cooperation
with the Tribunal reflects the enduring culture of impunity that became entrenched during the
Milošević era. Others wish that Djindjić had gone farther, arguing that “leaders need to lead.
They need to grasp the moment.”128 Whether or not Djindjić could have successfully advanced
moral as well as pragmatic grounds for Hague cooperation, the fact that he and other Serbian
leaders have largely failed to do so has compounded the ICTY’s challenges in Serbia.
Serbian political leaders who oppose the Tribunal have not been so reticent. Denouncing the transfer of Milošević to The Hague, then-President Koštunica compared Djindjić’s
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action to the “lawless and hasty acts” of the Milošević regime and warned: “Those measures
endanger our country, its citizens, and also the damaged peace in our region.”129 But while
Milošević’s transfer to The Hague provoked a crisis within the governing coalition,130 it did
not produce the consequences of which Koštunica warned. As one observer noted, “Koštunica
wasn’t happy, but at that moment Djindjić had the political power to transfer Milošević.”131 In
fact, many Serbians across a wide political spectrum experienced the transfer of Milošević
with a sense of relief.132
The response of the Serbian public to Milošević’s transfer—demonstrations against the
action were relatively small and scarcely destabilizing—marked a turning point in Serbia’s
willingness to accept if not yet embrace the process of accountability under way in The Hague.
In the view of one member of Djindjić’s government, “Before the Milošević transfer, there may
have been reluctance in some parts of the government to deal with this. After the transfer, we
realized one can do that and can do much more in the eyes of the public.”133
It took almost a year, however, before Serbia saw further notable progress in its
cooperation with the ICTY. In April 2002, the federal Yugoslav parliament enacted a law
on cooperation with the Tribunal establishing a national council for cooperation with responsibility for coordinating the government’s responses to ICTY requests.134 Soon after,
six indictees surrendered to the ICTY.135 Many of these transfers and surrenders were
spurred by annual deadlines linking U.S. aid appropriated for Serbia for that year to Serbia’s
satisfaction of criteria that included cooperation with the ICTY. A Congressional Research
Service (CRS) report summarized the impact of annual U.S. aid conditions on Serbian
cooperation during 2001–05 this way:
Since the coming to power of Serbian democrats in late 2000, Serbian cooperation
with the ICTY has followed a similar pattern each year: Serbia delivers several
indictees to the Tribunal just before or, at most, a few weeks after the certification
deadline. The Administration makes the certification as required by the legislation,
and urges Serbia to do more. However, Serbian cooperation then slows, with Serbian
leaders claiming that political and legal obstacles preclude greater efforts. Nevertheless, more indictees are delivered as the next deadline for certification approaches,
and so on.136
As the CRS study suggests, significant manifestations of Serbian cooperation with the
ICTY remained grudging even while Djindjić was prime minister of Serbia. While several
factors account for this, some are particularly relevant to our analysis. First, a substantial proportion of the Serbian electorate comprises hard-line nationalists who are strongly opposed to
war crimes prosecutions of Serbian leaders and citizens.137 With no political party commanding
an absolute majority of the Serbian population during the post-Milošević period, each elected
government has worried about antagonizing a significant sector of the public. Thus, even dur-
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ing periods when Prime Minister Koštunica has been comparatively cooperative with the ICTY,
he has framed his cooperation in terms that resonate with Serbian nationalists.
Second, “a good part” of many Serbians’ continued resistance to ICTY surrenders “comes
from the popularity of the indicted war criminals themselves.”138 A third consideration has
compounded Serbian authorities’ reluctance to cooperate fully with the ICTY—their concern
that evidence adduced in criminal trials in The Hague could increase Serbia’s vulnerability in
a genocide case filed against Serbia and Montenegro in 1993 at another international court
in The Hague, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which did not reach judgment until
February 2007.139
A fourth and crucial factor behind Serbia’s failure fully to cooperate with the ICTY
is opposition on the part of the country’s security services.140 Although some progress was
made in reforming these forces during the Djindjić government,141 they remained largely
unreformed and outside democratic control—a pattern that has persisted.142 These forces have
been strongly motivated to oppose ICTY cooperation:143 Corrupt security forces and police have
worked in tandem with criminal gangs whose members figured prominently in atrocities committed during the 1990s conflicts.144
For a time, even the reformist Djindjić opted “to live in an uneasy coexistence with the
security forces,”145 which the new government believed it did not yet have the power to dismantle. Djindjić had other reasons to abide one of the more notorious underworld criminals,
Milorad (“Legija”) Ulemek,146 a former special police commander whose notorious Special
Operations Unit of Serbia’s Secret Police, known as the Red Berets,147 figured prominently
in war crimes committed in Bosnia and later Kosovo.148 Djindjić thought that, by switching
his allegiance from Milošević to Djindjić in 2000, Legija had played a key role in enabling a
peaceful transfer of power to take place.149 Moreover Legija reportedly “played the lead role in
arresting Milošević in March 2001 ... on Djindjić’s instructions.”150 Besides, with Koštunica
commanding the support of the army, Djindjić reportedly relied on the former secret police
as a counterpoint to Koštunica’s military power base.151
By 2003, however, Djindjić moved to crack down on Legija and the organized crime
gang with which he was associated, the Zemun gang.152 On March 12, 2003 Djindjić’s cabinet
planned to sign warrants for the arrests of Legija and other leaders of his gang.153 On that day
Djindjić was assassinated. Suspicion immediately centered on Legija and the Zemun gang.
A three and one-half year long trial of Legija and other suspects in Djindjić’s assassination
resulted in a conviction of twelve co-defendants, including Legija, on May 23, 2007.154 Serbian
prosecutors claimed that the defendants wanted to prevent Djindjić from advancing in his
anti-organized crime campaign, ensure that no more war criminals were sent to The Hague,155
and bring hard-line nationalists back to power.156
The assassination provoked some debate about whether Western countries had pressed
Djindjić too hard to transfer indicted war criminals to The Hague.157 (Just before his assassination, a Belgrade paper reported that the ICTY was about to indict Legija,158 who in fact
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was not indicted by the Hague Tribunal by the time it reached its deadline for completing all
investigations by the end of 2004.159) But while Serbian citizens disagree on this point,160 there
is no dispute about the short-term impact of Djindjić’s assassination: public shock triggered
a period of significant political reform, which included a crackdown on organized crime and
renewed cooperation with the ICTY. Summarizing developments in this period, the International Crisis Group wrote:
In the immediate aftermath of the [Djindjić] shooting, public commitments to cooperate
with The Hague Tribunal were made; the army began to be put under civilian control;
the highest-profile organised crime gang and parts of the Milošević-era parallel security structures were dismantled; several dozen prominent murders, many dating back
to the old dictator’s time, were solved; and the new union of Serbia and Montenegro
was admitted to the Council of Europe. All this should have happened quickly after
Milošević’s fall in October 2000, but the reform agenda had been blocked by nationalist
forces around former Yugoslav President Vojislav Koštunica until February 2003.161
Government leaders who had previously hesitated to press for cooperation with the ICTY
now pledged to support it. As one commentator explained, “Zoran Djindjić’s tragic death gave
the post-Milošević authorities a kind of a social consensus to face and deal with war crimes.”162
During this period, the ruling coalition used its temporary emergency powers163 to amend the
2002 Law on Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, which had previously prevented Serbia
from transferring nationals indicted by ICTY after its enactment.164 In the four months following Djindjić’s assassination, four indictees in Serbia surrendered to the ICTY; a fifth was
arrested by the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro and transferred to The Hague.165
These surrenders and arrests represented a convergence of interests between The
Hague and Belgrade: Many of those sought by Serbian authorities for their role in organized
crime “were found to have participated in all sorts of paramilitary formations, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity. Some turned out to be the actual perpetrators of unbelievably
heinous crimes.”166
Public opinion polls showed that, for the first time since the ICTY was established, a
majority of the Serbian public favored cooperation with the Tribunal.167 It was also during this
period that the Serbian parliament adopted legislation, which had originated in the Djindjić
government, establishing specialized courts to deal with organized crime and war crimes,
respectively—a subject we explore in Chapter IV.
This burst of reformist zeal was short-lived,168 however, and the anti-Hague Serbian
Radical Party won the most seats in December 2003 parliamentary elections.169 The Serbian
government’s cooperation with the ICTY stalled, leading to a temporary suspension of U.S.
aid.170 Beginning in late 2004, however, the government once again reinvigorated its efforts
to secure transfers of indictees to the Hague Tribunal in the form of voluntary surrenders.
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By then, the reformist candidate of the Democratic Party, Boris Tadić, had been elected president of Serbia in an election held on June 27, 2004. But while Tadić has from the outset of
his presidency supported cooperation with the ICTY,171 he became “the president of a highly
dysfunctional state run by a minority government based on a shaky coalition,”172 with the
anti-Hague Koštunica holding the more powerful position of prime minister and controlling
key security sectors.173 Thus more important factors behind the late 2004–early 2005 surge in
cooperation may have been Serbian authorities’ desire to secure a resumption of U.S. aid and
potential benefits associated with the accession process promised by the European Union.
In a report to the UN Security Council on June 13, 2005, then ICTY Prosecutor Carla
del Ponte described a “major change” in Serbian cooperation. Access to witnesses and documents had been “continuously improving,” and Serbia had transferred fourteen indictees to
the Tribunal since December 2004.174 But the government’s cooperation came on controversial terms: Serbian authorities have provided financial rewards to those who surrender “voluntarily” as well as “considerable material compensation for the[ir] families,” while publicly
praising those who surrender as patriots and heroes.175 (As one observer notes, however, “there
were ‘voluntary surrenders’ where people showed up in their pajamas and with duct tape.”176)
Critics of this approach say that, even as the government has cooperated with the Tribunal
by inducing indictees to surrender, it has “strengthen[ed] the public’s notion of an ‘unjust’
tribunal.”177
Serbia has, moreover, failed to arrest and transfer the ICTY’s two most wanted indictees,
both of whom were twice indicted on genocide charges in 1995. As noted earlier, one—Ratko
Mladić—is known to have been sheltered in Serbia for much of the period since then, drawing
a pension until December 2005. Because Mladić is widely reported still to be hiding in Serbia,
efforts to secure full Serbian cooperation with the ICTY have focused on his arrest.
Recent reports suggest, however, that the other most wanted ICTY fugitive, former
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, may also be in Serbia178 and has almost certainly been
in Serbia since his 1995 indictments.179 In an interview on Bosnia’s national television in
mid-December 2007, the Principal Deputy High Representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Raffi
Gregorian, said that both Karadžić and Mladić “are in Serbia, and Serbian Prime Minister
Vojislav Koštunica can solve the issue of their arrest by one telephone call.”180
Koštunica’s practice of securing “voluntary surrenders” of other indictees is part of a
broader policy of what he has called “two-way cooperation” between The Hague and Belgrade.181
Calling for this approach when he was sworn in as Prime Minister of Serbia in March 2004,
Koštunica indicated that other elements of the “two-way” relationship he sought would include
the ICTY’s willingness to grant provisional release to Serbian indictees, with the Serbian government providing guarantees that they would appear in court when their trials began,182 and
the transfer of cases from the ICTY to local courts in Serbia.183 In practice, as we discuss below,
another key element of the “two-way” relationship that has evolved between The Hague and
Belgrade entails ICTY sharing of information with Serbian war crimes prosecutors.184
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Serbia was rewarded for its late-2004-early 2005 cooperation with the ICTY: In May
2005, the European Union opened Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) talks with
Belgrade as a precursor to EU accession.185 But this round of cooperation, like others before
it, was short-lived. “[O]nce the talks were underway, Serbia halted all cooperation with the
Tribunal,” wrote Gareth Evans and James Lyon.186 And so on May 3, 2006, the EU suspended
SAA negotiations with Serbia over its failure to cooperate with the ICTY.187
Another year went by before Serbia took significant steps to renew its cooperation with
the ICTY. Then, soon after a new government was formed following months of difficult negotiations, the relationship between Belgrade and The Hague improved.188 In early June 2007,
ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte visited Belgrade. For the first time, her visit came at the
invitation of the government. Less than a week before her visit, authorities in Belgrade and
Republika Srpska (the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina) launched a successful joint operation to arrest the third-most wanted ICTY fugitive, Zdravko Tolimir189 (though Serbian authorities reportedly obscured the full extent of their role in Tolimir’s apprehension.190) Soon after,
the EU resumed SAA negotiations with Serbia.191
Del Ponte proclaimed her June 2007 visit to Serbia “the best” she had “had in eight
years” as ICTY prosecutor, in part because she thought the government would at last arrest
Ratko Mladić “within months.”192 Within weeks of her visit Serbian authorities, reportedly acting on intelligence provided by ICTY staff, played a major part in securing the arrest of another
ICTY indictee, Vlastimir Djordjević, who was found in Montenegro.193 In October 2007, Serbia
offered a reward of one million euros (approximately $1.4 million) for information leading to
Mladić’s arrest.194 But as 2007 drew to an end—along with Del Ponte’s term as ICTY Prosecutor—Serbia had not yet made good on its pledge to arrest Mladić.
Even so, the EU initialed an SAA agreement with Serbia on November 7, 2007. In the following months, there was speculation that the EU might even offer to sign the agreement with
Serbia in late January 2008, potentially putting Serbia on a fast track toward membership195 (a
prospect that concerned other countries in the region whose progress through the SAA process
had been or was being conditioned on their meeting criteria that now seemed more flexible
when it came to Serbia). By January 2008, the Netherlands and Belgium were the only EU
Member States still willing to state openly that they would not support signing an SAA with
Serbia until Mladić was arrested. Under pressure from other Member States that wanted to
move quickly to signing an SAA with Serbia, the two holdouts agreed to support a compromise: On February 7, 2008, the EU would offer Serbia a package of benefits to demonstrate
the EU’s good will and signal its intention to move toward signing the SAA in the future.196
While the calculations behind these developments were complex, a key factor was many
European governments’ desire to offer an inducement to Serbia to accept the inevitable independence of Kosovo at a time when long-protracted negotiations over the territory’s status were
exhausted without an agreed solution.197 (In a move vehemently opposed by Serbia, Kosovo
declared independence on February 17, 2008.198) A more immediate factor was the EU’s desire
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to bolster the more moderate presidential candidate, Boris Tadić, in the lead-up to an early
February 2008 run-off election after a strongly nationalist candidate had achieved a plurality
in an earlier vote.199 Although Tadić was re-elected president,200 Prime Minister Koštunica
immediately made clear that Serbia would not sign the agreement the EU had offered, which
Koštunica saw as a ploy to induce Serbian acquiescence in Kosovo’s independence.201 Deeply
divided, the Serbian government collapsed in March 2008 and scheduled parliamentary elections for May 11, 2008.202
In the lead-up to the vote, EU Member States struck another compromise that allowed
Serbia’s president to sign the SAA on April 29, 2008, with the caveat that implementation
would not take place until after the upcoming elections and only after the European Council
determines that Serbia has fully complied with its obligation to cooperate with the ICTY.203
The EU’s strategy may have contributed to election results that favored the pro-reformist
party of President Tadić.204 But, journalist Dejan Anastasijević, wrote, “this is not the only fix
that Serbia now needs; too many ghosts from the past still haunt the country. Fugitive Ratko
Mladić, indicted for the genocide of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, needs to be apprehended
and delivered to The Hague.”205
***
Although Serbia’s relationship with the ICTY has changed markedly since the Milošević era
and has gone through several phases since then, two patterns have remained constant: First,
Serbian cooperation with the ICTY, through arrests and provision of documents, has come
only in response to intense pressure from Western governments. Second, while cooperation
with The Hague is supported by Serbians who occupy the pro-reformist end of the country’s
political spectrum, there remains a vacuum of political leadership in support of cooperation
on moral grounds rather than as a precondition to ending Serbia’s continued estrangement
from the West. As Serbian human rights lawyer Biljana Kovačić-Vučo observed, “there’s no
clear message” about the principles underlying ICTY cooperation even among those who
support cooperation.206 Despite overall improvement in Serbian cooperation when measured
against the Tribunal’s earlier years, a 2004 assessment is equally relevant today: Serbia has
yet to “reach a national consensus about interpreting and addressing the consequences of its
past”207—and, as part of this, about cooperating with the Hague Tribunal.208
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III. Benchmarks for Successful
Impact in Serbia
The impact of any international criminal court is mediated by local actors, and this factor
has been crucially important in Serbia. The preceding overview of Serbia’s relationship with
the ICTY highlights the views of one manifestly important category of local actors—public officials—whose attitudes toward the Tribunal have been complex and varied but never
enthusiastically supportive and, on the part of some, implacably hostile. As noted earlier, at
times the government’s resistance to cooperation has been partly attributable to some elected
officials’ desire not to antagonize the segment of Serbian society that is strongly opposed to
war crimes prosecutions of Serbian suspects and whose support has at times been thought
necessary to form a government. Later we consider how these actors’ attitudes and actions
have challenged the ICTY’s ability to achieve its goals in Serbia and assess how well the ICTY
has met this challenge.
In contrast to those actors who have been hostile or at best ambivalent toward the
ICTY, a minority of Serbian citizens has championed the court and pressed the government
to meet its obligations toward the Hague Tribunal.209 This segment of Serbian society is no
more monolithic in its support for the ICTY than other Serbians are in their ambivalence or
opposition. Some enthusiastically embrace the Tribunal even as they recognize flaws in its
performance; for many others, the flaws loom large but they nonetheless support the ICTY’s
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core mission.210 While our understanding of what would constitute positive “ICTY impact” (or,
put differently, Tribunal successes) in Serbia was informed by our interviews with a range of
Serbians, the views of those who fundamentally support the Tribunal were especially instructive in this regard.211
As will be apparent, in some instances benchmarks of positive impact were identified in
terms that also convey a judgment of how well the ICTY has achieved its goals. Thus several
sections of this chapter (specifically, Sections A, C, and D) reflect some measure of assessment
by our interlocutors as well as their identification of benchmarks of ICTY successful impact. In
respect of other benchmarks, such as the ICTY’s impact on domestic war crimes prosecutions
and on Serbian society’s acknowledgement of political responsibility for past crimes, we defer
until later our assessment of how well the ICTY has achieved these objectives.212

A. Ensuring Prosecution of Atrocious Crimes;
Dispelling Impunity
For many of our Serbian interlocutors who support the ICTY, a key purpose advanced by the
Tribunal is, quite simply, to ensure that those who are responsible for atrocious crimes are
punished—something they do not believe would have happened without the ICTY.213 In the
words of one of our interlocutors in Serbia (and in the view of many), “if The Hague didn’t
exist, there would be no trials, no war crimes.”214
Several judges at the ICTY expressed a similar sentiment, expressing the view that
punishing perpetrators—especially those who bear major responsibility for crimes committed during the conflicts of the 1990s—is one of the principal objectives if not the sole task
of the court. When asked to articulate his understanding of the objectives of the ICTY, Judge
Fausto Pocar, the current president of the Tribunal, replied: “I would take it that the ICTY was
entrusted with prosecuting and holding trials for the main perpetrators ... and that’s the only
task.”215 Although the Security Council may have had other goals, such as fostering “peace,
stability and reconciliation,” he continued, the Tribunal itself cannot act as though it has a
“political mandate.”216 His colleague at the ICTY, Judge Theodor Meron, expressed a similar
sentiment. In his view, “the primary goal of an international tribunal is to do justice and punish atrocities.”217
For some of our Serbian interlocutors who pressed this point, what is important about
the ICTY’s work is that it sends a message to the future that atrocious crimes have consequences. Journalist Filip Svarm put the point this way: “The Hague Tribunal demonstrated
that not everything can be legalized.”218 Several ICTY judges whom we interviewed in The
Hague made similar points. In the view of Judge Meron, “Ending impunity for the terrible
crimes [committed in the former Yugoslavia] was always a primary goal.” And, he added,
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“That goal is largely being achieved.”219 In the view of Judge Wolfgang Schomburg, “By the
very existence of the Tribunal, the culture of impunity has found an end.”220 Judge Schomburg
elaborated: The ICTY is “fulfilling for the first time in history in the area of our responsibility the promise enshrined in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ... that ‘All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals.’ There are no longer
untouchables!”221
Serbian human rights lawyer Bogdan Ivanišević likewise believes that the ICTY has
helped dispel impunity in Serbia, and emphasized what he believes would have happened
if the ICTY had not been created. Convinced that there would have been no prosecutions of
war criminals in Serbia were it not for the ICTY, he insisted that its work “is important for its
own sake, because of justice. Because the message otherwise will be one can do whatever he
wants to do because he’s in power and that’s it. That kind of message would be disastrous.
The ICTY prevented that from happening.”222 Another human rights professional, Andrej
Nosov, emphasized the importance of prosecuting former Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milošević
in particular. By doing so, he said, the Hague Tribunal helped the Serbian public understand
that “there is no one who can order killings and stay unpunished.”223
Goran Svilanović, who served as Foreign Minister under the Djindjić government and
headed the government’s state council for coordination with the ICTY, believes that Milošević
“would never be prosecuted here”—i.e., in Serbia, if he had not been transferred to The Hague.
But Svilanović cautioned against an approach that becomes so focused on trying individuals
that the broader aims of prosecution are lost. “Basically, I thought [the ICTY] was there not
only to bring several tens of people to jail, but there was an idea behind it,” he told us.224 In
his view, the idea behind the Tribunal is that prosecutions would help inspire Serbian society
“to discuss the crimes” and affirm that “this should never happen again.”225
Journalist Dejan Anastasijević emphasizes the broadly corrosive impact of failing to
punish war crimes: “When a crime occurs and it’s unpunished,” he said,
a hole is opened in the fabric of society, like a hole in your stocking. If it’s left unattended, it tends to spread all over.... Because if it’s OK to kill or rape a human being
because the victim is a member of a community which we tend to see as our enemy,
where do we draw the line?226
Anastasijević recalled a case in which a drug dealer had defended himself on the ground
that he was trafficking heroine to “get even” with North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries
that bombed Serbia in 1999. Anastasijević summarized the dealer’s claim—“They gave us
bombs, we gave drugs to their children”—and observed: “Once a crime is justified for patriotic
reasons, you can put that label on anything. Not processing war crimes right away creates an
atmosphere of impunity that tends to spread to the whole society.”227
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B. Addressing the Past
Many of the Serbian citizens we interviewed who support the ICTY are deeply devoted to the
principle that Serbian society as a whole must acknowledge that atrocities were committed in
its name and that they were not justified. These Serbians believe that the ICTY plays a crucial
and necessary role in this process. (None, however, believes that the Tribunal bears sole or
even principal responsibility for advancing processes of national reckoning.)
A first step toward the kind of broad acknowledgment these citizens seek is public
knowledge. Thus one of our interlocutors, Ana Miljanić, suggested that a key measure of ICTY
success would be that “people remember over time things that were brought into public knowledge by the ICTY’s work.”228 In her view, a closely related objective is “to promote the ethical
message, however difficult.... What people thought boring is becoming crucial, and it’s basic
principles of international justice—questions of impunity [and] command responsibility.”229
Explaining why they believe it important for their compatriots to accept the facts
established in The Hague, some Serbian citizens who support the ICTY link this type of
acknowledgment to Serbia’s democratic transition. The Humanitarian Law Center, a leading
non-governmental human rights organization in Serbia, believes that “Serbia’s political system
... can invigorate its democratic culture only in so far as it has created room for memory of ‘that
past’” and believes that cooperation with The Hague is a key component of this process.230
This is not to say that Serbians who believe it is important to confront the past invariably
support the ICTY for that reason. Twenty-nine percent of respondents in a public opinion survey taken in December 2006 said they thought it was important to “face the truth and accept
our share of responsibility”231 for war crimes, while only 15 percent said that Serbia should
cooperate with the ICTY “to achieve justice.”232 Still, in our own interviews Serbians who support ICTY cooperation for principled rather than pragmatic reasons often cited as their reasons
the contribution of ICTY prosecutions to Serbia’s process of reckoning with past atrocities.
Ivan Janković, an attorney who characterized the ICTY’s role in educating Serbians
about crimes committed by their leaders as “extremely important,” explained why in terms
that emphasize Serbia’s capacity to function as a mature democracy: “If they’re not informed,
the public will not be aware of crimes [which is necessary] in order to make correct choices”
as citizens.233 Still, as we note later, some of our interlocutors believe that ICTY prosecutors
and judges have at times veered too far into the province of historians.234
To the extent that, in the view of many Serbian supporters of the ICTY, one of the
Tribunal’s most important functions is to advance public acknowledgment and condemnation of Milošević-era crimes, the Tribunal’s greatest challenges are presented by those sectors
of Serbian society that still need to be convinced. In later chapters we address the Tribunal’s
effectiveness in meeting these challenges, and assess the degree to which Serbian society has
acknowledged that indefensible crimes were committed in its name.235
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C. Reconciliation
A significant number of interviewees who support the ICTY believe that its work is essential to
long-term reconciliation236 and stability, even if in the short term it “can have negative effects
on stabilization.”237 Recalling how former President Milošević and other nationalist leaders
manipulated the past to foment ethnic violence in the 1990s, they believe that “if you don’t
have justice, you can always manipulate the past ... A lot of space is left for manipulation, [as
happened] after the Second World War. You have different historiographies.” But “once you
have a sentence by a legal authority, you have firm ground [ for discussion].”238
But, we asked, why should the ICTY play this role? Human rights activist Andrej Nosov
responded succinctly: “There is no better.”239 As already noted, many of our interlocutors
in Serbia believe that, if the ICTY had not been established, a legal reckoning for atrocities
committed in the 1990s would not have occurred in Serbia, at least not “for a long time to
come.”240 And, Nosov insists, without justice there can be no lasting peace.241
By its nature, the claim that ICTY prosecutions will serve the interests of long-term
reconciliation cannot be tested now.242 But twentieth century Yugoslav history provides a basis
for this claim: Although Yugoslavia’s distinct ethnic groups committed mass atrocities against
each other during World War II, the country’s leader, Josip Broz Tito, “largely dispens[ed]
with war crimes trials like those the Allies convened at Nuremberg.”243 The few trials carried out in post-war Yugoslavia were controversial; critics believed that Tito’s real motive
in prosecuting the two most prominent post-war defendants was to silence opponents
of the Communist government.244 Against this background, nationalist leaders in the
former Yugoslavia were able to tap a deep reservoir of latent inter-ethnic fear and foment
violence during the 1990s.

D. Removing Criminals from the Region
As many of our interlocutors noted, it is still too early for anything like a final assessment of
the ICTY’s impact. But some noted that the Tribunal has already been at least partially successful in one respect—“physically removing some of the worst criminals”245 from the region.
Describing this as an important role of the Tribunal “that is usually neglected by experts,”
journalist Dejan Anastasijević observed: “It was good not to have them around, at all levels.”246
In fact, Anastasijević says, Milošević’s indictment in 1999 helped bring about Serbia’s transition to a democratically-elected government the following year.247 Another Serbian journalist,
Filip Svarm, believes that if the country’s leading war criminals had not been prosecuted, “we
would have had a mafia oligarchy as our leaders.”248
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From the vantage point of the post-Milošević government, according to a former official in the Djindjić administration, Dušan Protić, the “removal of Milošević was something
that had to be done in order to make the next step in our democratization process. He would
have been an unbearable burden [if he were tried] in Serbian jurisdiction. The government
probably felt, ... they can handle him [in The Hague]; we cannot.”249 As noted earlier, former
Foreign Minister Goran Svilanović, who handled the Serbian government’s negotiations with
the Hague Tribunal during the period of the Djindjić government, believes that “if Milošević
had not been extradited, he would never be prosecuted here.”250
Not everyone agrees. Radmila Nakarada believes that, “If Milošević had remained, he
would have likely been prosecuted here. There was a widespread feeling that what he did was
very painful for his citizens—that was in the air.”251 Others, however, emphasize the risks to
which Protić alluded. For example, noting that “some say [Milošević] should have been tried in
Belgrade,” journalist Antonela Riha commented: “If that happened, there would be thousands
outside [the courthouse]. That would be a mess. He’d be even more of a hero if he were tried
here.”252 Describing Djindjić’s decision to transfer Milošević to the ICTY as “maybe the most
important decision” made by the late prime minister, Riha added: “He [i.e., Milošević] may be
in a cave, but you never know when he’ll come out.”253
While many Serbians believe their country still cannot handle the most controversial
war crimes cases, there is some divergence of views among these individuals about which
cases belong in The Hague. Ana Miljanić wonders whether the ICTY’s current prosecution
of one high-profile Serbian defendant, Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Šešelj, may have
boosted his stature. “Being prosecuted in The Hague means you’re special,” Miljanić says,
and “this helped mystify [Šešelj].”254 Asserting that the “Šešelj case so belonged in Belgrade,”
Miljanić nonetheless noted that the local “War Crimes Chamber didn’t want him prosecuted
here.”255 (Indeed, the Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor told us that he believed it would be
destabilizing to try Šešelj in Belgrade.256)

E. Strengthening the Rule of Law by Enhancing
Local Justice in War Crimes Cases
As we elaborate more fully below, our interlocutors in Serbia credit the ICTY with mixed
success so far in meeting some of these goals. But when it comes to another dimension of
impact—enhancing Serbia’s domestic capacity to prosecute war crimes cases—virtually all of
our Serbian interlocutors, including those who have otherwise been at best ambivalent about
the Tribunal, consider the ICTY’s contributions to be significant.
Almost everyone we interviewed in Serbia praised the ICTY’s role in the establishment
in 2003 of a War Crimes Chamber in the District Court of Belgrade and in strengthening its
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capacity to investigate and prosecute war crimes. Notably, people who were otherwise largely
critical of the ICTY believe that it deserves substantial credit for this development; some said
that if this were the ICTY’s only accomplishment, it would be a major contribution.257
Important in its own right, this development has affected other aspects of ICTY
impact considered in this report. Accordingly, we address this subject first in the section
that follows.
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IV. Strengthening the Rule of Law
by Enhancing Local Justice
in War Crimes Cases
Among the justifications cited by the Security Council when it established the ICTY, advancing
the capacity of local courts to dispense justice did not even merit consideration.258 Indeed, the
Tribunal was established in large part because local courts could not be trusted to prosecute
war crimes impartially, if at all. And so it comes as something of a surprise that one of the
ICTY’s most widely-acknowledged, if nonetheless limited, achievements in Serbia has been
its role in spurring the creation of a local war crimes court and helping to empower that court
to function professionally.

A. Establishment of the War Crimes Chamber
Along with a separate chamber that deals with organized crime, the War Crimes Chamber
(WCC) was established as a specialized component of the Belgrade District Court. The WCC
was established pursuant to legislation enacted on July 1, 2003,259 which also established
the position of Prosecutor for War Crimes260 and a special War Crimes Investigation Service in Serbia’s Ministry of the Interior.261 This law gave the WCC exclusive responsibility for
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prosecutions involving war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide instituted after the
law was enacted; other Serbian courts that had begun such trials would complete the cases they
had initiated.262 Pursuant to this law, in July 2003 the National Assembly elected263 Vladimir
Vukčević, at that time the Deputy Public Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia, as Prosecutor
for War Crimes. The WCC began operating in October 2003264 and started its first trial in
March 2004.

1.

The ICTY’s Role in the Establishment of the WCC

In contrast to the War Crimes Chamber of Bosnia, which was created with the direct involvement of the ICTY,265 the ICTY did not play a formal role in establishing the Serbian WCC or
the office of the War Crimes Prosecutor.266 Nor does the War Crimes Prosecutor “think the
Hague Tribunal had anything to do with the establishment of [his] office.”267 Instead, he told
us, “after the democratic changes in our country the new democratic authorities wanted to do
away with both organized crime and war crimes.”268
Everyone we interviewed about this question shares Vukčević’s belief that the change
in government following the fall of Milošević was crucial to the WCC’s creation. But almost
everyone else insisted that the WCC “wouldn’t exist but for the ICTY,”269 “at least not at this
point.”270 As indicated earlier, many of our interlocutors believe that if the ICTY had not been
created, “no one would ever actually bring to trial anyone who committed [war] crimes.”271 In
this view, the ICTY’s operation provided the context in which it became possible for Serbia to
assume a serious role in prosecuting 1990s-era atrocities.
Dušan Protić, who served as Deputy Minister of Justice in the Djindjić government,
explained his government’s approach to war crimes prosecutions and its understanding of
how the ICTY advanced its aims in this regard. With respect to the first point, Protić described
two principal concerns motivating his government to address Serbian war crimes: “We really
thought that this was a shame, something we have to bring to the surface.”272 In addition,
the Djindjić government believed that “addressing this problem” was important to its goal of
advancing Serbia’s “integration in the West.”273
But when the government entered office, Protić continued, “we were all aware that our
judicial system is fragile and not capable of dealing with these issues” and believed it necessary
to create “specialized judicial institutions to deal with these crimes, ... to focus the capacity
we had toward one point.”274 During that period, Serbia and Montenegro’s minister of justice,
Vladan Batić, initiated plans to establish specialized courts to deal with both organized crimes
and war crimes.275 In this setting, according to Protić, the government saw the ICTY as “very
useful” in helping to create a political space for Serbia to deal with “the burden of war crimes
in all its dimensions.”276
In the view of Ivan Jovanović, National Legal Advisor to the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Djindić government’s initiative reflected “good-faith
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plans for laying down the foundation for a better society not based on lies” about Serbian
crimes. There was, he believes, “a genuine willingness to establish the truth, to bring Serbian
perpetrators to justice before Serbian courts, to reach a higher level of self responsibility and
self-criticism through war crimes prosecutions.”277 But there was not a “sufficient shift of
political elites” to enable the government to implement plans for local war crimes prosecutions
during Djindjić’s lifetime.278
A confluence of other interests and developments eventually made it possible to establish the WCC even in the face of continuing opposition from extreme nationalists. To begin,
the assassination of Zoran Djindjić in mid-March 2003 provided crucial impetus for adopting
the law establishing the WCC.279 That law was adopted during the period of reformist advances
that followed Djindjić’s assassination.280 Even in this comparatively supportive environment,
strong encouragement from other governments and international organizations apparently
was needed to bring the law establishing the WCC over the legislative finish line.281
But the WCC still faced opposition from some sectors of government and the Serbian
public.282 Batić’s successor as Minister of Justice, Zoran Stojković, openly opposed its creation
and at one point sought the Prosecutor’s ouster.283 Describing the political environment in
which he took office, Vukčević told a reporter:
At that time there was no political will and consensus for the prosecution of war crimes,
that is for sure; the contrary was the case: there was resistance, the public opinion was
still thinking that the Serbs were attacked, that we led a defensive war and that all those
who took part in it were patriots.284
Recalling this period, Vukčević told us that what he needed at the time he began functioning as War Crimes Prosecutor was “international support, because here I encountered a
great deal of resistance by the Executive Branch.”285
In this environment, some sectors of the government of Serbia and Montenegro as well
as the public came to support local prosecutions for reasons that relate directly to the ICTY.
At a time when the ICTY had begun to implement its completion strategy, a key component
of which was transferring some of its pending cases to local courts, Serbia and Montenegro
hoped that the Tribunal would transfer cases against Serbian defendants to its courts. But the
Tribunal would do so only if it had confidence in the fairness of those courts.286 Prime Minister Koštunica also sought to convince the Tribunal that Serbia could handle prosecutions of
certain indictees who had not yet been transferred to The Hague.
Similar sentiments may have paved the way for public acceptance of domestic war
crimes prosecutions. A public opinion survey taken in late 2004 disclosed that, while only 57
percent of Serbians polled believed that national courts were ready to prosecute war crimes
cases,287 71 percent believed that it would be better to institute such prosecutions in local courts
than in The Hague.288 Thus anti-Hague sentiment may have helped foster a more receptive
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attitude toward domestic war crimes prosecutions than would have been possible without
the ICTY.
Once the WCC began operating, the ICTY provided another incentive for the new court
to provide a credible process of prosecutions: As a matter of “professional pride,” some parts of
the government “wanted to show that they could” prosecute war criminals proficently.289 By his
own account, this was a key (but not the only) motivating factor behind Vukčević’s decision to
accept the job of War Crimes Prosecutor despite the deficit of political support he confronted
early in his tenure.290 The fact that Serbian war crimes are prosecuted before an international
court, in Vukčević’s view, places Serbia on the same level as war-ravaged countries whose legal
systems he believes are far less developed.291 Thus, while genuinely troubled by his compatriots’ treatment of war criminals as heroes,292 Vukčević also accepted the position of War Crimes
Prosecutor “to show that local courts can handle these cases”293 and “because of the fact that
the only alternative ... is The Hague Tribunal.”294
Beyond the particular ways in which the ICTY provided an incentive for Serbian courts
to take up war crimes prosecutions, perhaps the Tribunal’s most important contribution
was that of beginning the process of legal reckoning at a time when local trials were not
possible in Serbia. Bruno Vekarić, the War Crimes Prosecutor’s spokesman and a former
member of the Djindjić government, summarized the ICTY’s role vis-à-vis local prosecutions this way:
The Hague Tribunal was the necessity of the moment during Milošević [because there
was no will to prosecute crimes in Serbian courts]. I do believe it was exactly through
the Hague Tribunal that the process of facing the past was initiated in the states of the
former Yugoslavia.295
Judge Siniša Važić, the President of the WCC, describes the ICTY as “the embryo”
for his court. He explains: “Everyone learned from [the ICTY both] as an idea and as
know how.”296

2. The ICTY’s Impact on the Operation of the WCC
If the Tribunal was the “embryo” from which the WCC evolved, its transfer of “know
how” and other resources has had a significant impact on the chamber’s actual operation.297
While these contributions take myriad forms, the most important are training and transfer
of evidence.
a) Transfer of Evidence
Under Rule 11bis of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Tribunal can refer to
state courts cases involving mid- and lower-level suspects whose indictments have already
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been confirmed but whose trials have not yet begun in The Hague. The ICTY has transferred
to Serbia only one 11bis case, which involved an indictee who had previously been granted
provisional release in Serbia on mental health grounds. 298 The Tribunal’s failure to
transfer other 11bis cases to Serbia reflects, among other considerations, the ICTY’s general
preference for transferring cases to the state in whose territory the crimes charged by the
Hague Prosecutor were committed299—a policy that has in practice led the ICTY to transfer
11bis cases to Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular and, in one instance, to Croatia.
But, as one observer noted, this should not detract from “what has happened: the
transfer of a wealth of information from non-indicted cases.”300 The ICTY has referred to
Serbia at least two major cases that had been under investigation but had not yet resulted
in an indictment in The Hague; in doing so, then ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte provided
to her Belgrade counterpart evidence that her office had gathered in its own investigations.301
The War Crimes Prosecutor’s office also has access to the ICTY Prosecutor’s data base,
which, according to Vukčević, “has facilitated our work.”302 (The transfer of information
may now be occurring in two directions: In a May 2008 report to the UN Security Council, ICTY Prosecutor Serge Brammertz noted that the Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor has
provided his own office “evidentiary material from ongoing trials before the War Crimes
Chambers in Belgrade.”303)
Pursuant to an amendment to the law establishing the WCC enacted in December
2004, evidence collected by the ICTY can “upon its transfer be used as evidence in the criminal proceedings before the” WCC.304 In the view of OSCE legal advisor Ivan Jovanović, “this
was one of the main advances in the Serbian legal system.” The rationale for this amendment,
Jovanović explains, is that Serbian prosecutors “won’t waste time if there’s good evidence”
already available thanks to ICTY investigative efforts.305
Although it is not yet clear “to what extent ICTY evidence [can] be used in court in non
11bis cases,”306 well-informed observers believe that evidence provided by the Hague prosecutor’s office was crucial to the early investigations of the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor,
particularly in light of Serbian police investigators’ reluctance to assist the prosecutor.307 And
while Vukčević understandably emphasizes his office’s ability to take investigative work well
beyond that undertaken by the ICTY,308 he noted in an interview in November 2006 that until
recently, Serbian authorities did not have access to evidence in neighboring countries where
crimes occurred, and thus the ICTY had been able to gather evidence Serbian prosecutors
could not have obtained directly.309 In short, the ICTY provided hard evidence that the War
Crimes Prosecutor’s office was able to “own” and build upon in its earliest cases.
Nataša Kandić, who has worked closely with both the ICTY and the WCC, believes that
case files provided by the former not only provided crucial evidence for local cases but also
bolstered the resolve of local prosecutors. In her view, local prosecutors “were afraid, but faced
with documentation, they said [to themselves] ‘it’s horrible what Serbs did to others’” and were
motivated to overcome their fear and pursue investigations.310
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Along with other forms of collaboration, this type of information-sharing has fostered what Kandić (and others) call “a partnership” between the two war crimes courts.311
The Prosecutor, President, other officials at the WCC and informed observers extolled the
“great cooperation” between the WCC and the ICTY. Against the background of over a
decade of highly public antagonism between The Hague and Belgrade, this is itself a striking
development.
b) Transfer of “Know How”
In the view of many interviewees, the ICTY has made just as important a contribution to the
WCC through its transfer of expertise and the model of fair process it has provided. The ICTY
has participated in training programs for Serbian war crimes prosecutors and judges, many
of which have been organized by other institutions and governments312 and some of which
have taken place at the ICTY.
According to WCC President Siniša Važić, every judge in the chamber had visited the
ICTY two or three times by November 2006.313 Programs have included training in substantive areas of international criminal law, such as the law of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
principles of command responsibility and other forms of criminal responsibility.314 Both Važić
and another judge we interviewed described these trainings as very useful. (A report by the
International Center for Transitional Justice notes, however, that in the two written opinions
the WCC had issued by August 2007, it had “made no use of ICTY jurisprudence concerning
issues of substantive law.”)315
In contrast, however, the War Crimes Prosecutor spoke of training programs in which
ICTY personnel participated as well as other encounters with ICTY prosecutors for the most
part disdainfully. Proud of what he considers his and his staff’s superior expertise, Vukčević
said that his first experience with Hague prosecutors was “shocking, because they had no
idea of the extent of our professional knowledge.”316 In his view, “their discussions indicated
that they didn’t believe we knew anything about different legal doctrines, such as command
responsibility.”317 But Vukčević conceded that some of the training seminars he and his staff
attended “have been relatively successful and useful.”318
Alexandra Milenov, who represented the ICTY Registry in Belgrade for four years,
has a different impression. Noting that some of the Belgrade prosecutors had not traveled
abroad before they visited The Hague to participate in ICTY training programs, she observes
that their professional interaction with ICTY judges “did wonders for local prosecutors’ selfconfidence.”319
Perhaps the most tangible manifestation of the ICTY’s transfer of “know how” has
come in the form of procedural innovations adopted in Serbia that were inspired by the ICTY.
Describing the influence of Hague procedures on local war crimes law, Judge Važić said,
“We took a lot of provisions” from the ICTY, such as those authorizing the use of video links
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that enable witnesses living in other countries who are afraid or unable to testify in Serbia to
provide testimony from afar320 and preparing both audio recordings and transcripts of trial
proceedings.321
Other contributions, Judge Važić said, include the transfer of “skills, knowledge and
technical gadgets”—the last category principally entailing computerization of WCC facilities.322
Another judge on the Belgrade District Court cited as particularly valuable ICTY training
geared at improving investigative skills and at introducing judges to “judicial techniques” in
such areas as handling proof and “how to treat the victims.”323
Others also singled out for special praise the model and training that the ICTY has
provided for dealing with witnesses in war crimes cases. Ivana Ramić, spokeswoman for the
Belgrade District Court and the WCC, told us that her court “got the idea to establish” its
own victim and witness support unit from a conference in Sarajevo organized by the ICTY’s
Victim and Witness Support Unit (VWSU)324 and reported that “we have very good cooperation with the VWSU of the ICTY.”325 Members of the Serbian unit have received training at
the ICTY.326
Beyond the direct transfer of “know how” from The Hague to Belgrade, several of our
interlocutors believe that the ICTY has provided Serbian courts an inspirational model of
fair process. Nataša Kandić, who organized some judicial training programs for WCC judges
in The Hague, believes that Serbian judges took home a lesson in judicial independence.
“Before,” she said, “it was usual to see judges and prosecutors discussing cases. Now you
don’t see that”—a change she attributes to Serbian judges observing “how far judges are from
prosecutors” during their visits to the ICTY.327
Although critical of the ICTY in many respects, Ljiljana Smajlović, a Serbian journalist
who has covered the ICTY, believes the Tribunal has “taught the public what defendants are
entitled to [and] this is a positive impact.”328 Having grown accustomed to procedural guarantees she observed while covering the Milošević trial in particular, Smajlović told us she was
“flabbergasted by the different quality” of Serbian courts when she observed a high-profile case
back home. Describing this aspect of the ICTY proceedings as “a civic education,” Smajlović
noted: “Now it seems intolerable not to have words recorded” in local trials and describes the
WCC’s emulation of the ICTY practice of audiotaping court proceedings as “marvelous.”329 In
larger perspective, Smajlović said, “Our wits were sharpened by watching those proceedings
[in The Hague]—and we were educated.”330
Ivan Janković, an attorney, foresees “another beneficial effect” of the ICTY on Serbian
legal proceedings. Noting that a significant number of Serbian lawyers have now defended
clients in The Hague, Janković believes that many of them
learned a lot from the Tribunal (and of course many didn’t), and that effect is very long
term. We will see it in domestic cases that have nothing to do with war crimes. It’s a
critical spillover effect.331
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Others note a broader spillover effect. Sonja Prostan, who serves as a judge in the
Second Municipal Court of Belgrade, notes that procedural innovations inspired by the ICTY,
ranging from witness protection measures to status conferences aimed at improving the efficiency of trial proceedings, have not only been followed in WCC proceedings but also have
been “implemented in the new criminal procedure code” of Serbia.332

B. Assessing the WCC
This is not the place for an in-depth evaluation of the WCC333 but a preliminary review is necessary to assess the nature of the ICTY’s impact on local war crimes prosecutions. Although, as
we explain below, the WCC’s record to date is mixed, it represents a continuation of progress
that began after the change of government in 2000 and significant progress compared to
the period before 2000. Until the WCC began operating, FRY courts had prosecuted only a
handful of war crimes cases stemming from the 1990s conflicts334 and these typically involved
“ordinary soldiers or lower-ranking officers.”335 Those convicted of war crimes generally were
punished with low sentences.336 Describing prosecutions during the Milošević era, the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center writes that “crimes committed against [non-Serbs]
could not be tried in a professional and an impartial manner in Serbia.”337 Dušan Protić, who
served as Deputy Minister of Justice in the Djindjić government, summarized the Miloševićera cases this way: “[T]hese were not success stories, they didn’t meet the expectations of
anyone involved.”338
This pattern began to change during the Djindjić-Koštunica government. Two trials
before the Belgrade District Court that were instituted after the fall of Milošević, both of which
resulted in convictions and imposition of the maximum prison term, reflected some progress
in the capacity of Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) to conduct credible war crimes prosecutions.339
But these cases also demonstrated continuing limits on SaM’s political will to prosecute those
bearing superior responsibility for war crimes.340 Moreover the Supreme Court quashed the
verdicts in both cases, though it affirmed the same sentences in both cases following retrial.
Similar limits persist in prosecutions before the WCC, which have not yet targeted
anyone in a senior position. Many of our Serbian interlocutors noted that the War Crimes
Prosecutor operates within a limited political space,341 which has prevented him from going
“all the way up the food chain.”342
Non-governmental organizations have criticized the War Crimes Prosecutor not only
for limiting indictments to lower-level perpetrators, but also for obscuring links between the
acts of these defendants and policies instituted by state institutions in his framing of indictments and presentation of evidence at trial.343 As we note below, a verdict rendered in April
2007 in the Scorpions case elicited similar concerns, this time directed at the presiding judge.
Public opinion surveys are consistent with the views expressed by our Serbian interlocutors.
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In a survey undertaken in December 2006, only a quarter of those polled said they thought
the War Crimes Prosecutor would act independent of political pressures.344
In the view of Bruno Vekarić, the spokesman for the War Crimes Prosecutor, the “strongest pressures” come from “the political zone, particularly the Serbian Radical Party” (SRS),
whose past or current members figure prominently among those accused of war crimes.
Vekarić described frequent verbal attacks by SRS members of the Serbian Parliament.345 Moreover, because of the “delicate nature of this issue,” Vekarić told us in November 2006, many
other politicians avoid supporting [the War Crimes Prosecutor] publicly.”346 In a separate interview, Vekarić acknowledged that objections relating to the prosecutor’s failure so far to indict
people in a superior position were “well grounded,”347 while nonetheless insisting that some
of those who have been brought to justice occupied relatively senior positions and promising
higher-level indictments in the future.348
The War Crimes Prosecutor, Vladimir Vukčević, told us he believes there is a “kind
of obstacle we would meet if we made cases against the most senior officials—we would
be exposed to great pressures by the public.”349 Vukčević speculated that “we would probably have 5,000 people demonstrating” if SRS leader Vojislav Šešelj, who is on trial in The
Hague, were prosecuted before the WCC. But, Vukčević said, with the possible exceptions
of what he believes would be a strong public backlash if his office sought to prosecute ICTY
suspects Šešelj and Ratko Mladić, his office does not face insurmountable political pressures
and obstacles today.350
Also troubling is the relatively small number of cases prosecuted to date by the War
Crimes Prosecutor. While the advent of the WCC has seen more prosecutions in Serbia of
Serbian suspects for war crimes committed against non-Serbs compared to previous years,
the number of prosecutions mounted to date is not particularly impressive for a court that is
dedicated solely to prosecuting crimes of this nature.351
Some observers have noted that cases tried before the WCC have been initiated primarily on the basis of evidence provided by other sources, including the ICTY, the Humanitarian
Law Center, prosecutors from Bosnia and Croatia352 and, in a case involving war crimes allegedly committed by Serbian police officers against three brothers who possessed U.S. citizenship, the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. Relying—at least initially—on evidence already developed
to initiate cases that are inherently complex is not itself problematic. As noted earlier, receiving
compelling evidence from the ICTY may have helped bolster the resolve of Serbian war crimes
prosecutors to pursue their first cases seriously. Still, to the extent this pattern were to remain
characteristic of Serbian war crimes prosecutions, it may reflect a more systemic problem—the
WCC’s dearth of resources relative to the nature of its mandate.353
Another significant impediment has come from police investigators. As noted earlier,
the law establishing the WCC provides for a War Crimes Investigation Service within the
Ministry of Interior that “shall act on requests of the Prosecutor for War Crimes.”354 According
to several sources interviewed in late 2006, this unit had not been willing to take initiative
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in investigating war crimes, instead responding to specific requests from the War Crimes
Prosecutor without going any farther than the literal confines of those requests.355 For awhile,
a key reason for its reticence may have been that the first two heads of this unit were themselves implicated in war crimes or closely linked to individuals responsible for such crimes.356
Ivan Jovanović, whose organization (the OSCE) monitors trials before the WCC, explained the
underlying dynamic this way:
Since war crimes committed in Kosovo were committed mainly by regular police forces
or paramilitary attached to the police, [this arrangement] means that police are investigating their colleagues, which leads to blockades.... There’s a tendency to focus on
courts, but they’re just at the end of a chain of responsibility which starts with the police.
The police are a weak if not the weakest link in the chain.357
But, Jovanović added in late 2006, this situation may be “changing for the better.”358
When interviewed in June 2007, Jovanović said he believed that the Prosecutor now has “better
control” over the investigation unit than during the initial stage of his mandate.359 At the same
time, the unit was showing more initiative.360 According to a deputy war crimes prosecutor
interviewed by the International Center for Transitional Justice in April 2007, the unit “provided solid assistance in amassing evidence on a major war crime in Kosovo.”361
At the other end of the chain of responsibility, the Supreme Court of Serbia has quashed
a majority of war crimes convictions rendered in recent years that it has had the opportunity
to review.362 In contrast to the trial judges of the WCC, whom the Humanitarian Law Center has praised for “their clear impartiality, professionalism, and commitment to the law”363
(though, as noted below, this assessment predated the WCC’s controversial judgment in the
Scorpions case), the Supreme Court has been criticized by local and international non-governmental organizations and others. Nataša Kandić describes the Supreme Court’s approach
to war crimes trials as “political” and believes that its judges want “to show the new judges
[on the War Crimes Chamber] that it won’t be easy to hold war crimes trials.”364 With others,
Biljana Kovačević-Vučo, Director of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in Belgrade,
faults the reasoning of the Supreme Court in decisions overturning war crimes verdicts as
poorly reasoned and ill-founded.365
Some believe that the Supreme Court’s propensity to overturn war crimes verdicts (as
well as verdicts rendered by the special chamber for organized crime) is partly attributable to
the fact that many of its members were Milošević-era appointees;366 several observers speculate
that another contributing factor might be that the Supreme Court was not included in initial
discussions concerning establishment of the specialized chamber.367 Some, however, believe
that differences between judges serving on the Supreme Court and those on the WCC have
been overstated.368 Even so, they believe, the Supreme Court may be overly cautious when it
comes to highly complex cases or cases in which the maximum penalty was imposed, pre-
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ferring to send these cases back to the trial level in case of doubt about some aspects of the
original trial verdict.369
These limitations are substantial and troubling. Even so, the record of the WCC contrasts positively with Milošević-era war crimes prosecutions. Between 1996 and 2002, only six
war crimes cases were instituted in FRY/Serbia and Montenegro.370 In the first three years of
its operations, the WCC instituted the same number of prosecutions371 and significantly more
investigations are under way. By the end of 2007, all but one of its cases involved Serbian
perpetrators accused of crimes against non-Serb victims and substantial sentences have been
passed against those convicted. And while the Supreme Court is prone to quash war crimes
verdicts, verdicts invalidated by the Supreme Court have typically been reinstated upon retrial
and then sustained on appeal before the Supreme Court—though the damage done by its
reversal of the first-instance verdicts in the eyes of victims may be hard to undo.372
In late 2006, and despite her previously-noted concerns, Nataša Kandić described trials
before the Belgrade WCC as “probably the best in the region.”373 In a preliminary assessment,
the Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) that Kandić leads found that WCC “judges have so
far manifested a high level of professionalism and considerably improved the quality of war
crimes prosecutions compared with the previous period.”374 In December 2006, HLC wrote
that judges in the WCC
are loyal to the law and show utmost respect for both victims’ rights and rights of the
accused. In the course of all war crimes trials to date as well as the current trials known
to the public ... the judges were guided by facts and evidence trying to shed light on
the context behind the events and thus complete the picture of the responsibility or
innocence of the accused.375
But Kandić and others strongly criticized a verdict issued on April 10, 2007 in a case
that was instituted following the release of a video showing Serbs shooting Muslim victims
near Srebrenica at the time of the genocidal massacre there. Two of the four defendants
received the maximum sentence of 20 years but two others received sentences of 13 and five
years, respectively; a fifth was acquitted.376 Although relatives had testified that the victims
were in Srebrenica until the July 1995 genocide, when they were bussed to a nearby town to
be executed,377 the presiding judge said it was not clear they had come from Srebrenica378 or
were victims of the genocide there.379 Writing that “the most disappointing thing about the
verdict was the efforts of the judge ... to absolve the Serbian government,” journalist Dejan
Anastasijević reported that the judge “described the Scorpions as an ‘irregular volunteer unit’
and insisted that they had no relationship with any branch of government in Serbia, despite
ample evidence that they had been an integral part of Milošević’s security forces.”380
The Humanitarian Law Center condemned the verdict as “not based on law and facts,”
and said: “There is an impression that the court was led by political rather than legal reasons
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in an effort to adjust its stances to those of the Serbian authorities regarding the responsibility
for genocide committed in Srebrenica....”381 Kandić further faulted the judge’s approach in the
case “as minimalist, prosecuting only those who could be directly linked on the video to the
shootings, but refusing to push any further.”382
While this verdict has tempered their earlier, largely positive, assessment of WCC
judges, Kandić and others have credited the chamber with achievements that transcend specific judgments. In the words of Belgrade Court Judge Radmila Dragičević-Dičić, the WCC
“brings [ justice] closer to the people” and enables Serbs to “see victims from Bosnia here.”383
This, she believes, has not been possible in cases tried in The Hague, in part because the
public sees high-profile cases as “connected to politics.... People don’t see victims, they see
politics in The Hague.”384
In interviews that preceded two especially disappointing developments—the WCC’s
verdict in the Scorpions case and the Supreme Court’s reversal of its verdict in another case,
Ovcˇara—Kandić, too, emphasized the importance of victims’ participation in WCC trials.
Kandić, who has played a leading role in encouraging victims from Bosnia and Croatia to
testify and has formally represented them before the WCC,385 believes it is “important that our
society face the victims, the ‘others’, because we’re only talking here about Serbs as victims.
Through the trials, it’s an opportunity to show what we did to others.”386
If victims’ participation in WCC trials can help advance Serbia’s process of coming
to terms with past atrocities, Kandić believes it can serve another goal that is just as important—“recognition of victims and their dignity.”387 Invoking the Srebrenica massacre in an
interview conducted before the aforementioned verdict in the Scorpions case, she explained:
“All Bosniaks know what happened but if you want to show them that the families of victims
are important, it means that Serbian society—the state and its institutions—should invite
the victims [to testify in Serbian courts], to restore their dignity.”388 Others emphasize the
regional repercussions of the phenomenon Kandić has helped support. When Croatian or
Bosniak victims testify in Serbian courts and find a semblance of justice, this “contributes to
reconciliation.”389 Conversely, when victims’ hopes are thwarted—as happened following the
Supreme Court’s decision to invalidate the Ovcˇara verdict—“this [affects] the credibility of the
entire [WCC] structure.”390
Several of our interlocutors noted that the prosecution of war crimes before Belgrade’s
own courts has helped to “normalize” prosecution of war crimes.391 Although cases before the
WCC have elicited verbal attacks and threats from hard-line nationalists, the local prosecutions have generally been “far less controversial and provocative” than those in The Hague.392
The Serbian public seems “more open to the War Crimes Chamber”393—more ready, that is,
to accept the legitimacy of its prosecutions even when the defendants are people who would
be considered “patriots” or “heroes” if they were prosecuted in The Hague.394 Even so, almost
all of our interlocutors, notably including War Crimes Prosecutor Vukčević, believe that the
Belgrade court could not handle the prosecution of high-profile cases, such as that of Ratko
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Mladić.395 And, as the verdict in the Scorpions case suggests, there are significant limits to how
far the WCC is able or willing to go even when the perpetrators are lower-level perpetrators.
Finally, a salutary byproduct of the work of the Belgrade WCC—along with that of an
internationalized War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia-Herzegovina and specialized war crimes
chambers in Croatia—has been increased cooperation between war crimes prosecutors of
these three countries. Although this cooperation has been limited by each country’s inability
under current domestic law to extradite its nationals,396 it has entailed the exchange of evidence and other forms of trans-border cooperation in the prosecution of war crimes. While
helping improve the quality of war crimes prosecutions in countries that receive crucial evidence from other jurisdictions, the fact that war crimes prosecutors in Serbia, Croatia and
Bosnia are cooperating is itself a meaningful marker of progress in a region recently racked
by nationalist violence.
In sum, virtually all of our Serbian interlocutors believe that the WCC would not have
been established but for the ICTY and that the ICTY has helped ensure that the Belgrade
court operates as effectively as possible within a still-cramped political stage. Notably, many
Serbians, including the country’s War Crimes Prosecutor, believe that the WCC does not yet
have the political space to prosecute those at the highest level of responsibility for war crimes.
These cases, they insist, belong in The Hague.
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V. Addressing the Past
As noted earlier, Serbian citizens who support the ICTY often emphasize its potential to
foster a societal process of “addressing the past.”397 For these citizens, “addressing the past”
connotes broad acknowledgment by their society that Serbian leaders and other ethnic Serbs
supported by Serbian institutions committed terrible atrocities during the 1990s conflicts in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo and that these crimes were not justified on such
grounds as self-defense.
Perhaps more than any other dimension of impact addressed in this chapter, the questions of whether and to what extent the ICTY has contributed to a broad social process of
addressing the past can be answered only in partial and provisional terms.398 For one thing, the
ICTY is only one of many actors that have had an impact on Serbia’s process of addressing past
crimes. Local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played a more prominent role in
pressing Serbian society to confront those crimes and, as noted earlier, the ICTY’s record is
inevitably interpreted by a host of domestic actors, ranging from hostile political leaders to
supportive NGOs. Just as important, Serbia’s process of addressing past crimes is likely to be
the work of generations.399 Serbia remains very much a country in the early stages of political
transition, and the enduring influence of illiberal nationalist actors continues to constrain the
country’s ability and will to confront crimes committed in the recent past. In this setting, we
can only provide tentative observations about the ICTY’s impact so far in advancing a process
of reckoning with past crimes as well as its effectiveness in surmounting the formidable challenges presented by Serbia’s political landscape.
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A. Acknowledging—and Denying—Crimes
Committed by Serbs
Although a substantial majority of cases prosecuted before the ICTY have involved crimes
perpetrated by ethnic Serbs against non-Serb victims, public opinion polls undertaken in
recent years suggest that most Serbian citizens either have not yet been persuaded that Serbs
committed a majority of war crimes400 during the 1990s conflicts or are unwilling to acknowledge what they know.
In a public opinion survey undertaken in August 2004, 84 percent of Serbian respondents said that they believe Serbs had the largest number of victims during the wars in the
former Yugoslavia from 1991 through 1995; 71 percent said they believed that Serbs committed
fewer crimes than Croats, Albanians and Muslims, while only 8 percent responded that Serbs
committed the greatest number of war crimes in that period.401 In April 2005, 81 percent of
the respondents said that the largest number of victims of these conflicts were Serbs and 5
percent responded that Serbs committed the largest number of crimes.402 Consistent with
these findings, surveys undertaken in recent years show that a significant number of Serbian
respondents question the truth behind most reports they have heard concerning war crimes
perpetrated by Serbs. Conversely, Serbian respondents have in general been more likely to
believe reports they have heard about war crimes perpetrated by Croats, Bosniaks and Kosovo
Albanians against Serb victims403 or to believe that crimes committed against Serbs are war
crimes rather than inevitable acts of war.404
If, as many of the ICTY’s Serbian supporters believe, a key indicator of positive ICTY
impact is broad public acceptance of the proposition that Serb perpetrators were responsible
for atrocities committed during the 1990s, these survey results suggest that the Tribunal
has thus far had limited success in this regard. Yet recent trends suggest that there has been
a modest increase in self-reported acceptance of the facts underlying key episodes of mass
violence committed by Serb perpetrators.405 These include the shelling of Sarajevo by Serbian
armed forces and the July 1995 massacre of some 7,000–8,000 Bosniaks in Srebrenica, which
has been judged by both the ICTY406 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ)407 to constitute genocide. In both 2004 and 2006, 68 percent of survey respondents said they had heard
that many civilians were killed by snipers in Sarajevo. While only 57 percent reported that they
believed these reports in 2004 (an increase since 2001, when only 50 percent reported that they
believed these reports408), in 2006, 60 percent reported that they believed the reports.409
Seventy-one percent of the respondents in a survey taken in December 2006 (before
the ICJ issued its February 2007 judgment finding that the Srebrenica massacre was a genocide) reported that they had heard that a large number of Muslims had been massacred in
Srebrenica; only half reported that they believed these reports.410 While this high level of
reported disbelief is troubling, it represents a modest increase in public acknowledgment of
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the core facts underlying the Srebrenica genocide since 2004.411 Notably, too, while polling
results show a modest increase in recent years in Serbian respondents’ belief in the truth of
reports of atrocities committed by Serbs, the same period shows a decline in their belief in the
truth of reports of key episodes of violence committed against Serbs by the Kosovo Liberation
Army and Croatian forces.412

B. Factors that May Partially Explain Survey Results
We do not believe that data currently available provide a basis for drawing reliable conclusions about the reasons underlying many Serbians’ reported lack of knowledge or doubts
about atrocities committed by Serbs.413 We note, however, several possibilities that may play
a contributing part.
One possibility is that Serbian citizens’ mistrust of the ICTY undermines the Tribunal’s
ability to serve an educative function in Serbia. In surveys undertaken in 2003, 2004, and
2005, 69 percent of Serbian respondents said they did not believe the ICTY tries Serb defendants impartially;414 in 2006, 63 percent responded this way.415 Yet a majority of Serbians say
they know little about the ICTY: 72 percent of those who responded in 2005 said they know
either “little” or “very little” about the organization and operation of the Tribunal (this percentage decreased to 57 percent in 2006).416 Svetlana Logar, Deputy Director of one of the organizations that conducted these surveys, Strategic Marketing Research, believes that Serbians’
attitudes would be different if the public were better informed about ICTY trials. But, she says,
“we just have interpretations, not facts.”417
Echoing a theme that emerged repeatedly in our interviews, Logar noted that within
Serbia, “the political elite were the ones primarily making the image of the [ICTY].”418 “People
don’t have faith in our politicians,” Logar observed, “yet they’re receptive to their message that
the ICTY is anti-Serb.”419
The most virulently anti-Hague message has come from the Serbian Radical Party (SRS)
and the Socialist Party of Serbia, a smaller party formerly led by Slobodan Milošević.420 Against
their hostile rhetoric and their treatment of indicted war criminals as national heroes,421 few
politicians have publicly supported the ICTY on grounds that readily translate into broad public condemnation of Serbian defendants’ responsibility for war crimes. In view of the relative
strength of the SRS,422 Strategic Marketing Research Director Srd−jan Bogosavljević asserted
that even Serbian politicians who are supportive of the ICTY dare not contradict the Radicals’
anti-Hague rhetoric with an alternative story lest they lose votes.423
Instead, Serbian leaders have typically justified cooperation with the ICTY on pragmatic
rather than principled grounds; some have treated ICTY indictees as patriots and heroes.
There are exceptions: edomir Jovanović, leader of the opposition Liberal Democratic Party,
has called for Serbia to “face our historical heritage” on moral, not expedient, grounds.424 Soon
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after a new government was formed in Serbia in 2007, the government’s Foreign Minister,
Vuk Jeremić, said that his country was committed to extraditing ICTY fugitives Ratko Mladić
and Radovan Karadžić not only because it is “our international obligation, but also our moral
duty toward neighbors.”425 Serbian President Boris Tadić has apologized to citizens of Bosnia
and Croatia for crimes committed in Serbia’s name during the 1990s and has supported Serbian cooperation with the ICTY.426 But political leaders have rarely confronted Serbian society
with “unequivocally clear condemnations of what happened”427 or linked such condemnations
to their cooperation with the ICTY.
Addressing what he called the “very entrenched denial” of Serb war crimes by many
Serbian citizens, human rights lawyer Bogdan Ivanišević notes that it is impossible to know
if their attitudes would be different if Serbia’s political elite had taken a different approach.
“But,” he says, “common sense suggests it would have an impact. Beliefs are affected by those
one believes.”428 Public opinion surveys are consistent with Ivanišević’s intuition. A survey
conducted in December 2006 showed that only 15 percent of those polled—the same percentage as in 2003 and 2004—support cooperation with the ICTY in order to achieve justice while
a majority support cooperation on the pragmatic grounds often cited by political leaders.429
These results do not necessarily mean that the 54 percent of respondents who reported
in December 2006 that they support cooperation with the ICTY on pragmatic rather than
moral grounds are unable to accept the Tribunal’s judgments of guilt as well-founded. AntiHague attitudes, as Radmila Nakarada notes, do not necessarily correlate with “total denial.”430
But these survey results are consistent with the proposition that Serbian citizens’ views are in
general more likely to be shaped by local leaders’ attitudes than by judgments of the ICTY.
Several other factors reinforce many Serbians’ continuing reluctance to acknowledge
that Serbs were responsible for atrocities committed in the 1990s and to condemn them
unequivocally. To begin, almost all of the crimes charged before the ICTY occurred outside
of Serbia proper (i.e., the part of Serbia that does not include Kosovo). While many Croatian
Serb victims of crimes committed by Croatian forces now live in Serbia, they do not represent
a significant political constituency there.431 Thus there is no major victim community in Serbia
whose political voice and experience offset the rhetoric of nationalist leaders. As one of our
interlocutors emphasized, “What is important for understanding, we don’t have victims [in
Serbia], only refugees. Serbians don’t know what it’s like to be victims.”432
Moreover Serbians who have been prosecuted in The Hague, including Slobodan
Milošević, “were not in the battlefield. So the perception is that they’re in The Hague for
political reasons.”433 Refik Hodžić, who at the time of our interview was Acting Head of the
Media Outreach and Web offices of the ICTY,434 makes a similar point. Because “there were
no crimes committed in Serbia, the people have no day-to-day connection” to the crimes prosecuted in The Hague.435 Hodžić contrasts this situation with that in Bosnia, where there are
many Serbs who also “don’t want to acknowledge” past crimes but are “constantly reminded”
of mass atrocities committed in their country.436
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In the short term, moreover, the passage of time may be working against many Serbians’
ability to remember much of what they have learned about Serb atrocities. Public opinion survey questions aimed at ascertaining whether respondents have heard about major war crimes
committed during the 1990s indicate that memories of these events faded between 2001 and
2005 (as noted above, this general trend applies to crimes committed by Croats and Muslims
as well as those attributed to Serb perpetrators).437 Explaining this trend during an interview
in November 2006, Srd−jan Bogosavljević, whose organization Strategic Marketing Research
conducted these surveys in partnership with the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, noted:
“These things happened thirteen, fourteen years ago. Over time, people are forgetting.”438
Psychological dynamics are also at play. As Bogosavljević observes, “People like to forget
about this” part of their history.439 Vojin Dimitrijević, whose Belgrade Centre for Human Rights
co-sponsored the surveys noted above, sounds a similar theme: “The question is whether you
really don’t know or you refuse to know.”440 Attorney Ivan Janković believes that, when it comes
to crimes of great magnitude, most people cannot help but know what happened but “often
deny their knowledge.”441
Several of our interlocutors believe that deeply personal as well as political factors contribute to “a culture of denial.”442 “When you have a brother or a husband” who participated
in the conflicts, for example, “you don’t think of him as someone who could take a knife to a
child,” Jadranka Jelinčić suggested. “For very personal reasons you can’t change the framework
in which you think.”443
Many nonetheless believe that evidence adduced in The Hague has significantly “shrunk
the public space”444 in which political leaders can credibly deny the truth about notorious
atrocities. For a long time, nationalist figures claimed that the number of people killed in Srebrenica in July 1995 was much lower than the real figure while blaming many of the killings
on intra-Muslim violence. “Now,” Bogdan Ivanišević notes, “people who say that are from the
margins.... There is incomparably less distortion of the past.”445 Jadranka Jelinčić makes much
the same point: “It’s now very difficult to deny that certain things happened and that cultural
elites were responsible.”446 Thus, if the ICTY has had only limited impact in shaping public
knowledge and attitudes, its verdicts and the evidence introduced in the courtroom have at
least diminished the space for outright denial. Still, Jelinčić notes, this knowledge “doesn’t
necessarily make people regret” crimes they can no longer credibly deny.447
Of course, there have been other sources of information about 1990s-era war crimes
and these have doubtless played a part in shrinking the public space for denial.448 Many of
our interlocutors are convinced, however, that the ICTY has played an important role in this
regard. As journalist Ljiljana Smajlović put it, “There’s no question that the ICTY has educated
the public; we’ve found out more about war crimes and the ... inner workings of the government than we would ever have found out—and about the criminal aspects of the regime.”449
She believes that the “findings of the Tribunal are more accepted now” than during earlier
periods; as a result of “what we’ve found out in The Hague,” the public now “accepts that
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Serbs committed enormous crimes,” including the Srebrenica massacre. Still, Smajlović notes,
“after fifteen years” of propaganda it is difficult to change people’s minds. “You can only say
this person committed this crime. People can accept that, but not that they’re responsible for
failing to go on the streets”450—i.e., that they bear political responsibility for failing to protest
crimes committed by their leaders.
Smajlović and others believe, however, that the ICTY has laid an enduring factual
foundation that local organizations, such as “lawyers’ groups,” can build upon in a broader
educative project.451 Sonja Stojanović, Executive Director of the Belgrade-based Center for CivilMilitary Relations, believes that the ICTY “managed to compile information and archives that
will prevent future mythologies. For any researcher in the future, ICTY evidence will be crucial
for all sides.”452 But, she said, “unfortunately” Serbian society—which Stojanović described as
“very frustrated”—is “not yet ready to handle” this information.453
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VI. Performance-Related Factors
As the previous chapter emphasized, constraints inherent in Serbia’s political landscape have
limited the ICTY’s ability to contribute to Serbian society’s reckoning with crimes committed in its name. We now shift focus and consider whether factors within the control of the
ICTY have either enhanced or detracted from the Tribunal’s ability to have a positive impact
in Serbia.

A. Outreach
If Serbia’s political elite and media have played the leading role in shaping public attitudes
toward the ICTY, the question arises whether the Tribunal has done enough to counter distortions of its record and to ensure that the Serbian public understands the principles that
guide its prosecutions. For the first five years of its operational existence,454 the answer is an
unambiguous “no”: Remarkably, the Tribunal did not even translate its judgments or other
documents into the languages spoken in the former Yugoslavia until 1999. It did not issue its
first press release in the Serbian language until 2000. Nor did it attempt to “reduce[e] the often
highly complex and lengthy legal discussions [that its decisions and judgments] contained to
a format more amenable to mass consumption.”455
Besides these early omissions in the relatively straightforward arena of public information, the Tribunal made virtually no effort for several years to counter the anti-Hague message
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of Slobodan Milošević and the Yugoslav media that largely served as his megaphone or to
engage with the Yugoslav public in a more affirmative sense. The notion of engagement with
the communities of the former Yugoslavia reportedly “did not sit well with some Tribunal
officials, who did not regard community outreach or public relations as the responsibility
of a court.”456 In consequence, as then ICTY President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald reported in
1999,
The Tribunal is viewed negatively by large segments of the population of the former
Yugoslavia. Its work is frequently politicized and used for propaganda purposes by its
opponents, who portray the Tribunal as persecuting one or other ethnic groups [sic] and
mistreating persons detained under its authority. Throughout the region, the Tribunal
is often viewed as remote and disconnected from the population and ... there is little
information available about it. Such views are exploited by authorities that do not recognise or co-operate with the Tribunal, thereby damaging efforts to foster reconciliation
and impeding the work of the Office of the Prosecutor. This is particularly detrimental
to the success of the Tribunal.457
That year, Judge McDonald established an Outreach Program that would enable the
Tribunal to speak for itself in the former Yugoslavia.458 The new program, she explained, would
be “dedicated to explaining [the ICTY’s] work and addressing the effects of misperceptions
and misinformation.”459 By that time, as former Outreach officer Olga Kavran has noted, the
challenge confronting the ICTY was compounded by years of leaving the field of communication about its work to nationalist leaders who opposed it. As Kavran noted, “It is much more
difficult to dismantle already established misperceptions and propaganda than it would have
been to start from the outset with updated and accurate information about the Tribunal.”460
Some, however, question whether earlier outreach efforts could have made a significant
difference given the strength of nationalist leaders’ and local media’s hostility to the ICTY—
and the fact that the Tribunal’s “interaction with the Serbian society was of necessity indirect,
i.e. through the Serbia government’s and Serbian media’s (re)interpretation.”461 Mirko Klarin,
founder and director of a news agency that reports on ICTY proceedings from The Hague, is
“certain that the results would have been the same” if the ICTY had published its press releases
in local languages and established its Outreach Program “from the very first day,” because
local attitudes are “primarily dictated by local political elites and the subordinated media.”462
Public opinion pollster Svetlana Logar believes that “changes by the Tribunal” in the way it
approached the Serbian public “could have made a difference at the margins.”463
While others agree that “change has to come from political elites,”464 some of our Serbian interlocutors are convinced that “earlier and more robust outreach”465 could have helped
reduce hostility toward the ICTY (though probably not among the pro-Milošević segment of
society that is consistently anti-Hague). Several observers and some ICTY staff singled out
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for special criticism the Tribunal’s failure to take greater advantage of the political opening
presented during the period of the Djindjić government.466
Operating on finite resources, the ICTY’s Outreach staff in The Hague and Serbia
have in recent years done an impressive job within this and other constraints. In the view of
one Serbian observer, “They’re now doing an excellent job” of outreach in Serbia “but they’re
understaffed.”467
The Belgrade staff of the ICTY’s Outreach Program comprises one senior professional
and an assistant. But the senior professional has other duties besides those associated with his
outreach portfolio: He represents the ICTY Registry in Serbia, which entails a broad range of
activities such as working with embassies and international organizations to assist the local
War Crimes Chamber (WCC) and facilitating requests to the ICTY from the WCC.468 Moreover
the budgetary resources supporting the outreach officer and his assistant cover “salaries but
not projects.”469
Within these constraints, Alexandra Milenov, who served as Registry Liaison Officer
in Serbia until September 2007, was able to respond to all media requests for comment and
interviews, which meant that local media stories on ICTY cases were more likely to include
the Tribunal’s statement alongside those of others. Thus, she noted, “[t]here isn’t silence from
the Tribunal, which is the worst state of affairs.”470 But while Milenov ensured that the ICTY
spoke for itself whenever it had the chance in the Serbian media, she found that it was “almost
impossible to develop projects,” to be “proactive” within the constraints of her budget and staff
resources.471 Yet the “outreach component [of her job] is infinite”472—that is, Milenov saw no
shortage of constructive projects that her office could undertake if it had the resources to do
more.
Since its inception, the Outreach Program has been extra-budgetary, meaning that its
funds must be raised from external sources.473 In the view of many who are familiar with the
program, this both reflects a dearth of institutional commitment and presents a distracting
challenge to the outreach staff.474 As one former outreach officer put it, the Outreach Program
“has been operating as an NGO, scraping up resources.”475 Concerns about the ICTY’s institutional commitment to its own Outreach Program led outreach officer Refik Hodžić to quit
working for the ICTY in 2004476 (Hodžić later returned to the ICTY and served until recently
as Acting Head of the Media Outreach and Web offices.)
Without a budget to implement projects, Alexandra Milenov welcomed opportunities
during her tenure in Serbia to participate in initiatives undertaken by local NGOs to educate
the public about the ICTY. For example, Milenov and ICTY officials from The Hague participated in a Belgrade conference organized by the Humanitarian Law Center concerning crimes
committed by Serbs in the Bosnian town of Prijedor that were prosecuted before the ICTY;
that night’s television news included a story about the conference.477 While serving as Registry
Liaison Officer in Serbia, Milenov also participated in a range of innovative programs developed by the Youth Initiative for Human Rights (YIHR), an NGO founded in 2003 that targets
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young Serbians with a view toward planting seeds of attitudinal change in the next generation
of leaders. In the words of its founder, YIHR was created “as an answer to Serbians’ denial of
war crimes, especially by young people.”478
Milenov has no doubt that these initiatives make a difference. Describing programs
organized by YIHR in which young victims from Kosovo and Bosnia have participated, Milenov says that she could see a transformation take place over the course of three hours. At the
beginning of a program, when asked what they think about the ICTY most of the youthful
audience responds that it is an anti-Serb institution. After they learn more about the Tribunal, including its work on behalf of Serb victims, and after hearing victims their own age
describe their experiences, the “tone changes.... [The program] challenges their understanding.... They’re no longer accusing; now they ask for information.”479
Andrej Nosov, YIHR’s founder and Executive Director, describes the impact of its educative programs in similar terms. Describing “500 young people who participated” in workshops with Milenov, Nosov says: “They’re different people now.”480 At the end of one program
convened in the town of Čačak, a stronghold of the extreme nationalist Serbian Radical Party
(SRS), a young woman was so moved by victims’ testimony that she removed her SRS tee
shirt when the program was over and apologized to the victims who had just spoken.481 Nosov
believes that young women like this one are likely to “persuade others”482 after participating
in YIHR programs about war crimes. Those who have participated in such programs, Nosov
says, now visit the ICTY Web site regularly.483
As Milenov noted, there has been a beneficial side-effect to her participation in programs organized by local NGOs—it has enabled the ICTY to contribute to local capacitybuilding.484 Her colleagues in the Outreach Program’s headquarters in The Hague likewise
believe that partnering with local NGOs is important for its own sake: it helps to foster a “sense
of ownership” of the ICTY’s work by local communities.485 But Milenov and others, including
Andrej Nosov, believe that the ICTY must amplify what it does through its participation in
the type of workshop described above. “There’s a ripple effect” that extends well beyond the
workshops themselves, Milenov says, but the impact could be far greater if these initiatives
were multiplied.486

B. Interaction between the ICTY Prosecutor
and Serbian Authorities
Among experts in international criminal tribunals, “outreach” has become a watchword for
interaction between such tribunals and the societies most affected by their work. But the
ICTY’s Outreach Program represents only part of the Tribunal’s public face in Serbia. As a
program of the ICTY’s Registry, it does not represent the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). And
in Serbia, the Prosecutor has had a particularly strong profile.487
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From the earliest years of the ICTY, its Prosecutor (and to a lesser but important extent
its President) have actively pressed Serbian authorities to surrender indicted suspects and to
provide documents sought by the Tribunal. The woman who served as Prosecutor for eight
years until the end of 2007, Carla del Ponte, visited Belgrade 20 times during her tenure
“to push Serbia to hand over suspects and her approach won her the nickname ‘the new
Gestapo.’”488 Del Ponte also aggressively pressed the European Union to maintain pressure on
Serbia to transfer Ratko Mladić to the ICTY—an approach she softened somewhat near the end
of her tenure, when the EU’s loosening of accession-related conditions appeared inevitable.
Along with local politicians’ anti-Hague rhetoric, these highly-visible efforts have gone a long
way toward defining the ICTY in the eyes of many Serbians. Belgrade-based pollster Srd−an
Bogosavljević observes: “On the one hand, the Hague Tribunal always came here as a threat;
on the other hand, political leaders [demonized it].”489
Goran Svilanović, who served as Serbia’s Foreign Minister and represented Serbia in
its negotiations with the ICTY during the Djindjić government, believes that the Tribunal’s
relentless insistence on surrenders came at the cost of conveying a deeper message—that
“this should never happen again.”490 “The idea” behind the Tribunal, he says, “should be to
[help Serbians] to discuss the crimes” that were committed. Instead of this happening, he
insists, “the ICTY was instrumental in bringing tens [of defendants] to jail—nothing beyond
that.”491
Svilanović notes, however, that del Ponte’s relentless pressure was crucial in securing
transfers. “Without her,” he estimates, “half of the [indictees] would still be at large.... Thanks
to her, a lot are in jail.”492 Svilanović is also quick to acknowledge that the government he
served “missed the opportunity to tell people” about the importance of confronting and condemning war crimes committed under the leadership of Serbians—“absolutely.”493 But he
believes that, by focusing on surrenders in its dealings with the Serbian government at the
expense of emphasizing the values underlying the ICTY’s work, “the Tribunal didn’t help us....
Now, the democratic partners in government only look forward to [surrendering] Mladić” so
that Serbia can “overcome obstacles” to its integration with the West.494
Sonja Biserko, leader of the Helsinki Committee in Serbia, places principal blame on
local leaders rather than on the ICTY for “commercializ[ing] the Tribunal”—that is, selling
ICTY cooperation to the Serbian public on grounds that emphasize the attendant pay-offs,
notably EU membership.495 Still, she believes that the EU itself “should have made [cooperation] a moral issue at the same time” that it emphasized the linkage between ICTY cooperation
and EU membership.496 She added: “We need a moral minimum.”497 Biljana Kovačević-Vučo,
Director of the Belgrade-based Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, shares this concern.
Describing the dynamic between the ICTY prosecutor and Belgrade as a “black market,” she
worries that the overriding dynamic can seem to be that of a “political game.”498
Many supporters of the ICTY believe that relentless pressure by the Prosecutor, along
with conditionality by the United States and, more recently, the EU, have been crucial to Ser-
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bian surrenders (and, as noted, even Svilanović agrees). Appeals to Serbian leaders’ self-interest (“If you want to enter the EU, you must cooperate with the ICTY fully”) may have been
more effective in securing surrenders than appeals to moral conscience. In this view, once
Serbia apprehends and surrenders outstanding indictees and the ICTY is able to complete its
work, trials in The Hague will provide the larger lessons in justice that are ill-suited to soundbites during visits to Serbia—particularly in an environment where anti-Hague rhetoric is
likely to receive substantially more media play.
Some challenge the notion that the ICTY’s former Prosecutor is in any way to blame
for Serbia’s enduring recalcitrance when it comes to cooperation, noting that she would not
have had to press relentlessly for Serbian cooperation if Serbian authorities had fully met their
obligations toward the ICTY. Although Croatian authorities, too, resisted the ICTY’s efforts to
secure custody of high-level Croatian indictees, Croatia ultimately ensured that these fugitives
were transferred to The Hague.
Still, our interviews raise the question whether the long-term goals of the ICTY may
be better served if public appeals for cooperation are fine-tuned somewhat with a view toward
ensuring that they are framed more consistently in terms of the principles the ICTY advances
and not solely in terms of the benefits that will accrue once Serbia meets its outstanding obligations. Efforts by the ICTY’s outreach officers to convey a justice-oriented message can go
only so far if high-profile ICTY officials do not reinforce that message when they visit Serbia.
This is not to suggest, however, that the ICTY bears principal responsibility for Serbia’s failure
to acknowledge that crimes were committed in its name and to condemn them—or for the
local media’s distortion of ICTY officials’ position.

C. Other Performance-Related Factors that Affect
the ICTY’s Impact
With a view toward ascertaining whether and how specific aspects of the ICTY’s judicial and
prosecutorial performance affect its impact in Serbia, we sought to identify “breakthrough
moments” in the Tribunal’s work in which its goals of accountability were demonstrably
advanced as well as stand-out moments in which they were retarded. In a similar vein, we
have tried to identify recurring patterns in the ICTY’s operation that appear significantly to
affect its impact, for better or for worse, in Serbia.
As we explain below, one of the more significant “breakthrough” moments in recent
ICTY history occurred in the context of the Milošević trial, when a video shown by prosecutors, which recorded the execution by members of a Serb unit of several young Muslims near
Srebrenica, galvanized the Serbian public and had a notable impact in dispelling Serbian
denial in relation to the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. Conversely, public broadcasts of Milošević’s
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trial—which ICTY supporters in Serbia had hoped would play a pivotal role in educating other
Serbians about their country’s role in 1990’s atrocities—instead highlighted what many Serbians saw as Milošević’s superior “performance.” Milošević’s death soon before his marathon
trial was due to end shattered hopes of a turn-around in public perceptions.
Several other patterns in ICTY practice have undermined the Tribunal’s image in Serbia
and, correspondingly, its ability to serve an educative role there. These include lengthy periods
of pre-trial detention, comparatively low sentences for Muslim defendants convicted of atrocities, and the Tribunal’s decision to allow a prominent Kosovo Albanian defendant to participate
in political activities while awaiting trial.

1.

Videos: “A Wall of Denial ... Began to Crack”499

Visual images have played a notable role in mediating the Serbian public’s understanding of
the ICTY’s work. On the relatively positive side of the ledger, at times video images introduced
during ICTY trials have seized the Serbian public’s attention and altered their perceptions
in ways that advanced social acknowledgement of past crimes.500 The best known example
occurred in June 2005, when the ICTY prosecution showed during the trial of Slobodan
Milošević501 a video tape that captured an execution of six Bosnian Muslim men, two of whom
were only 17 years old, by members of a Serb paramilitary unit known as the Scorpions.502 The
victims, who were cruelly taunted before they were shot, had been taken from Srebrenica at
the time of the 1995 genocide there to a nearby town, Trnovo, where they were executed.
The day after it was shown in The Hague, the Scorpions video was broadcast on Serbian
television and then was “repeatedly shown on television in countries throughout the Balkan
region.”503 Describing the public reaction in Serbia, the Washington Post reported that local
broadcasts of the video “ripped away the veil of secrecy and denial of Serbian military operations in Bosnia during the 1992–95 war.... No longer was it possible to label atrocity tales as
Bosnian Muslim propaganda amplified by inventive foreign correspondents, as many Serbs
had done for a decade.”504 Recalling the video’s impact in a later article, the New York Times
reported that the “tape was seen as a watershed in Serbia as it confronted ordinary Serbs with
first-hand evidence of the involvement of Serb security forces” in the Srebrenica killings.505
When the video was shown, Prime Minister Koštunica, who had previously treated
indicted war criminals as patriots, denounced their crimes unequivocally and announced the
immediate arrest of the perpetrators, who were put on trial in Belgrade.506 In a country that
remains starkly divided on the issue of war crimes, the atrocities shown in the Scorpions video
were denounced “across the political spectrum.”507
While the impact of the Scorpions video was profound, it would be an overstatement
to say that its public airing transformed Serbian attitudes. In a public opinion survey taken
soon after the video’s release, one-third of the respondents said they thought the video was
a fabrication.508 But while nationalist figures initially challenged the video’s authenticity,
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they “very soon revised” their position,509 conceding the authenticity of the video but broadcasting “awful videos of Bosniaks killing Serbs” in order to show that the former, too, “are
criminals.”510
Despite the public’s equivocal responses, Serbians still widely credit the Scorpions video
as having profoundly altered public perceptions, particularly about the Srebrenica massacre.
During a period when, as previously noted, public awareness of other 1990s-era atrocities has
begun to fade, there has been an increase (albeit modest) in public acceptance that atrocities
were committed in Srebrenica since the Scorpions video was aired.511 Several of our interlocutors in Serbia also cited videos shown in other ICTY trials, as well as documentaries broadcast
on B92, as having had a significant if limited impact on public opinion.
To the extent that one goal of war crimes prosecutions is to educate the public about the
crimes prosecuted, these observations suggest that a particularly effective vehicle for doing
may be through the use of videotaped material that is emotionally compelling—as well as
legally relevant in the case of videos introduced at trial. Public opinion surveys conducted in
Germany following a widely-viewed television series on the Holocaust in 1979 reinforce this
inference, “demonstrat[ing] that television can have a major impact and could be one of the
most powerful tools in encouraging attitude change.”512 Still, surveys undertaken eight years
later suggest that “the effects of broadcasts are possibly short term, especially when there
is still a dominant social environment opposed to the idea of moral responsibility for past
atrocities.”5513

2. The Trial of Slobodan Milošević
No case prosecuted at the ICTY has been more closely followed in Serbia than the trial of
former Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milošević, which began on February 12, 2002, and ended
without a final judgment after Milošević died on March 11, 2006.514 In view of the high level
of public interest in the case,515 the Milošević trial has played an important part in shaping
many Serbians’ views of the ICTY and their attitudes toward the process of accountability
underway in The Hague.
As already noted, despite the trial’s abrupt ending without final judgment, some aspects
of the Milošević prosecution served important goals. Evidence produced in court, such as the
now-famous Scorpions video, had a galvanizing impact on Serbian opinion, eroding collective denial about Serbian involvement in atrocities committed during the 1990s conflicts.
Moreover the very fact that Slobodan Milošević faced trial countered the lesson in impunity
that had taken hold during his years in office, establishing that “there is no one who can order
killings and stay unpunished.”516
Overall, however, the trial proceedings thwarted the hopes of Serbians who support the
ICTY. In the sections that follow we explain why, focusing on discrete aspects of the Milošević
case—and on processes that mediated the trial proceedings for Serbian observers—that were
especially important in shaping the trial’s impact.
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a) Expectations
Serbians who support the process of accountability underway in The Hague had hoped the trial
would provide a critical “breakthrough moment” in the ICTY’s work, shedding light not only
on Milošević’s personal involvement in international crimes committed during the 1990s conflicts but also on the involvement of state institutions.517 While Belgrade’s involvement in the
Kosovo war was straightforward (most of the direct perpetrators of the crimes charged in the
Kosovo indictment were members of the Serbian police), evidence introduced in the Milošević
trial would likely provide new insights into Belgrade’s role in supporting Serb forces in Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, including its involvement in the 1995 Srebrenica genocide.518 If the
charges against Milošević were substantially proved, a final judgment would necessarily implicate the involvement of state institutions in atrocities committed during the 1990s Balkans
conflicts, potentially laying the foundation for a broad social reckoning within Serbia.
Moreover the trial would provide opportunities for Serbian citizens to hear evidence
of atrocious crimes and of their longtime leader’s personal responsibility for them.519 Many
Serbian citizens would, of course, remain loyal to Milošević and to the policies he pursued
no matter how compelling the legal case against him. But “maybe others would change their
mind”520 if they were confronted with evidence showing, for example, that Milošević knew
about the massacre in Srebrenica in advance.
b) Unanticipated Effects
In time, evidence introduced in the Milošević case may go some way toward vindicating these
hopes. Scholars and non-governmental organizations have begun what will likely be a long
process of reclaiming that evidence and establishing non-judicial processes of learning from
it. Moreover trials still under way in The Hague may result in judgments that achieve some of
the results expected in the Milošević case, shedding light on the relationship between Belgrade
and Serb forces operating in Bosnia and Croatia.521
But in the shorter-term, Serbians who support the ICTY see the Milošević trial as a
profound disappointment. While many aspects of the trial contributed to this—not least, its
length—the trial’s vexed beginning and its inconclusive ending loom especially large in critical
assessments by Serbians.
(i) The Trial Had a “Clumsy Start” 522
As has often been noted, at the outset of the Milošević trial public opinion polls in Serbia
showed a surge in the former president’s popularity523 (not widely reported, however, “it was
just at the very beginning of Milošević’s hearing that his popularity rose”; the trial “didn’t
have a lasting effect” on his popularity524). Crucial in explaining the dynamics behind this
temporary boost, Milošević represented himself at trial (while nonetheless insisting that he
did not recognize the ICTY). With a majority of Serbians riveted to television broadcasts of
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his trial, at least during the early weeks,525 this guaranteed Milošević considerable air time and
afforded him an opportunity directly to address the Serbian public he knew would be watching
broadcasts of his trial. Our Serbian interlocutors frequently cited several aspects of Milošević’s
trial that, in their view, enabled him effectively to exploit this opportunity and to undermine
the educative potential of his trial.
First, in myriad ways the trial proceedings, which took on the appearance of a direct
showdown between Milošević and his accusers, showcased what one journalist termed the
former president’s “superior knowledge”526 of contextual facts and of the perspective that Serbians would likely bring to bear as they viewed the proceedings.527 The former reinforced
many Serbians’ disdain for the ICTY and provided grounds for a dispirited society to cheer
Milošević’s “performance” in court. Describing the impression made by Milošević during the
first few days of his trial, Serbian pollster Srd−jan Bogosavljević noted, “He was really good....
Even people who hate him thought he was successful.”528
An example cited by several Serbians of what they considered inadequate efforts by
the ICTY prosecutors to take into account how Serbian viewers would see the trial proceedings was their decision to call Mahmut Bakalli, a Kosovo Albanian “with a lavish lifestyle,”529
as their first witness.530 Vojin Dimitrijević, who describes Bakalli’s testimony as “a very bad
beginning”531 for the Milošević trial, explains why:
The first witness was a disaster: Mahmut Bakalli, a former Kosovo Albanian Communist
official who is still remembered as a bon-vivant Tito’s satrap in Kosovo. This confused
man, who believes [himself ] to be an intellectual, pretended now to have always been
convinced that there was no life for ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia, thus contradicting
the Communist project which he had served. He was easy prey for Milošević who only
had to remind him of his inconsistencies.532
Of course any witness can backfire on the stand, and some of the examples cited by our
interlocutors to demonstrate ICTY officials’ poor grasp of the region, such as one prosecutor’s
mispronunciation of names, may say as much about their own disposition to find fault than
about serious flaws in the prosecutor’s preparation. But there is broad consensus that the
prosecution’s approach in the early days of the Milošević trial—when the Serbian audience
was especially large—was damaging.
More broadly, a number of our interlocutors in both Serbia and The Hague believe
that ICTY trials have often suffered in the eyes of the Serbian public because prosecutors and
judges have evinced a surprising level of ignorance about contemporary Serbia and recent
Serbian history. The harmful effects may be especially pronounced in Serbia: As journalist
Ljiljana Smajlović noted in another context, Serbia “is a very politically astute country”;
as a post-communist society accustomed to reading the proverbial tea leaves, people there
“invest effort” in understanding events that affect them.533 As we note in the following
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subsection, Milošević was often effective in capitalizing on his own keen awareness of his
Serbian audience.

(ii) Rhetoric that Resonates
A fundamental feature of Milošević’s trial was the political offense mounted by the defendant in his own defense. Lambasting the ICTY, which he repeatedly accused of being a tool
of Western powers,534 Milošević “transform[ed] the courtroom into his political platform.”535
Keenly aware of his Serbian audience,536 Milošević mounted a defense calculated to reinforce
widespread Serbian suspicions of the ICTY and, more generally, to resonate with Serbians.
Against the prosecutor’s charges that forces under Milošević’s command committed
international crimes against Kosovo Albanians, the defendant insisted that the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) was responsible for civilian casualties during the 178-day war
over Kosovo—and showed gruesome videos of victims of NATO air strikes to drive home his
claim.537 As reported by the Economist, in his opening statement Milošević described the trial
proceedings as “‘an ocean of lies’ concocted by Western powers to justify the NATO bombing
of Serbia during the Kosovo war.”538
Although these claims seemed preposterous to many observers outside Serbia, they had
strong resonance among many Serbians, who vividly recalled that Milošević was indicted for
alleged crimes in Kosovo at a time when they personally endured NATO attacks in the 1999
FRY-NATO war over Kosovo.539 More important, the fact that the prosecution’s case began
with charges relating to the Kosovo conflict enabled Milošević to tap into a large reservoir of
suspicion centered on the Tribunal’s failure to indict Milošević until NATO countries went to
war against his country.
As noted earlier, despite the fact that crimes eventually charged against Milošević were
perpetrated in Bosnia and Croatia in the early to mid-1990s, the ICTY did not issue its first
indictment against him until May 1999, when his country was at war with NATO. To Serbians, the correlation is straightforward. As journalist Filip Svarm put it, “Milošević went to the
Hague when he lost the war against NATO.”540 When the first indictment against Milošević
included crimes relating solely to Kosovo and not atrocities committed years earlier in Croatia
and Bosnia, Serbians saw the ICTY acting as “an instrument of power” rather than an institution of international justice.541
From the Tribunal, there are at least partial answers to the questions this sequencing of
indictments has raised: Announcing the first indictment of Milošević and four co-defendants
on May 27, 1999, then ICTY Prosecutor Louise Arbour recalled her “commitment to functioning as a real time law enforcement operation”—a commitment honored by her office’s
issuance of an indictment covering events that had occurred “since the beginning of this
year.”542 By issuing the Kosovo indictment while continuing to investigate earlier crimes, the
Prosecutor hoped to contribute to resolving a crisis that was still underway.543 Moreover, while
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denying “rumors that she moved quickly because she feared Western deal-cutters would offer
Milošević and his top leaders immunity... in return for their signatures on a plan to end the
[Kosovo] war,” Justice Arbour said that she had been prompted in part by concerns that the
indictees would be “factually put outside the reach of the law—they could disappear.”544
As for the question that still looms large in Serbia—why did the Prosecutor not have
enough evidence of crimes committed in the early to mid-1990s in Bosnia and Croatia until
late 2001, when Milošević was finally charged with these crimes?545—Clint Williamson, who
along with ICTY prosecutor Nancy Paterson led the Kosovo investigation, fills in some of the
gaps. While the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) was “certainly looking at the involvement of
Milošević in Serbia and Croatia all along,”546 Williamson recalled, it had to surmount a major
challenge with respect to crimes committed in those countries that the OTP did not face for
Kosovo—proving that Milošević was legally responsible for atrocities committed by forces he
did not formally command. Until Milošević was out of power, Williamson explained, insider
witnesses who could help the OTP meet this challenge were for the most part unwilling to
provide evidence against him.547
It is unclear whether the OTP made substantial efforts to persuade insider witnesses
to provide evidence before Milošević was in custody. According to a former prosecutor who
worked on the Milošević case, efforts to investigate the former president’s responsibility for
crimes committed in Bosnia and Croatia as well as Kosovo lacked focus and suffered from
“bureaucratic lethargy” until around 1999-2000. Still, this source notes that “better insider
witnesses” stepped forward after Milošević was in custody in The Hague.548
Beyond the timing of the first indictment, coming only when Milošević was at war with
NATO, many believe that the ICTY Prosecutor erred by beginning the case against Milošević
in court with the Kosovo charges.549 (In fact, the Prosecutor sought to avoid trying the Kosovo
case first but was required to do so by the ICTY Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber.550) As
has often been noted, in view of Serbians’ historical identification with Kosovo as the cradle of
their nation, this sequencing enabled Milošević to play to Serbian nationalism while reminding his home audience of the NATO bombs they endured during the Kosovo war.551 Describing
the trial dynamics, former Serbian Foreign Minister Goran Svilanović said: “[The prosecutors]
started with Kosovo, so Milošević could do a parallel [defense]. Every time the prosecutor said
“Kosovo,” he responded “NATO bombing.”552 Beyond reminding Serbians of their own suffering during the Kosovo war, beginning the trial with the Kosovo charges may have reinforced
Serbian perceptions that Milošević was put on trial because he went to war with NATO.

(iii) “His Ideology Was in the Indictment”553
Several of our Serbian interlocutors believe that ICTY prosecutors erred in framing their case
in ways that they believe opened the door to politicization. Journalist Dejan Anastasijević
believes that the Prosecutor made a “strategic error” by putting Milošević’s “ideology ... in
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the indictment.”554 In his view, the core error was “going into historical processes to provide
a fine grain detailed picture of how and why it happened” when history should be “left to
academics.”555 “This mistake,” he believes, “provided a platform for Milošević to have endless
arguments, often with the Prosecutor losing the arguments.”556 Anastasijević draws a general
conclusion from this experience. Noting that some believe that one role of the ICTY is to
establish a “historical truth,”557 Anastasijević believes that “no court in the world should aim
to discover historical truth. They should establish facts of the guilt of the defendant.”558
Another journalist, Filip Svarm, has similar concerns. Noting that “if you have a trial
against the mafia, the prosecutor won’t tell you how the mafia came to exist,” he believes the
ICTY prosecution veered too far into the realm of “social/political acts,” which “undermines
the legitimacy of the ICTY.”559 In his view, the indictment against Milošević was framed in
a way that enabled the defendant to “talk for history.” When Milošević did that, Svarm says,
he was “perceived favorably. [But] what he gained [when he responded politically to historical
testimony] was diminished when he encountered real victims” in court.560
We can understand why some aspects of the Prosecutor’s case might strike a Serbian
audience as veering too far into the realm of political and historical judgment. In an effort to
provide a historical context for the crimes charged against Milošević and to make seemingly
unrelated episodes of violence comprehensible as a coherent plan, the opening statements of
ICTY prosecutors at times made broad claims about Serbian nationalism. The testimony of
several historians touched upon similar themes.
That said, it is in the nature of the work of major war crimes tribunals to make factual
findings that may at times seem to range into the realm of historians (this may be unavoidable when the defendant is a former leader), and it is difficult to define in general terms
how much historical context is too much. Other well-known examples of major war crimes
judgments, including that of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg and the
Israeli District Court’s Judgment in the trial of Adolf Eichmann, include extensive accounts
of the historical context in which the defendants’ crimes occurred. Much—though not all—of
these historical accounts were framed by the charges against the defendants, some of which
by their nature require a determination of facts that may seem to belong in the province of
historians.
For example, the Allies’ charge of crimes against peace, which was the centerpiece of the
Nuremberg trial of major Nazi war criminals, required the IMT make factual determinations
relating to Germany’s preparation for aggressive war. Other portions of the IMT judgment
provided historical context that was helpful in making sense of the facts that formed the basis
of the Tribunal’s final judgment,561 and ICTY judgments have similarly often provided a historical context for the factual determinations the Tribunal has had to make.
When asked his view about the degree to which the ICTY should address the historical
context of crimes it judges, ICTY President Fausto Pocar noted that to some extent, the widespread nature of certain crimes—itself potentially an element of crimes against humanity562—
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“per se brings some element of writing the history of what happened” into a judgment. But,
he added, the judge should “go into the historical context only so far as is necessary for the
case at hand. We are not historians.”563
Struggling with the question of how much historical fact-finding is appropriate in a war
crimes trial like that of Adolf Eichmann,56 the Israeli District Court concluded that its work
must be strictly limited to “investigat[ing] the truth of the prosecutor’s charges against the
accused who is on trial.... Whatever requires clarification to achieve” this end, it concluded,
“must be examined at the trial, and whatever is foreign to it must be excluded from the
proceedings.”565
To a lawyer’s eye, there is a solid legal basis for other portions of the ICTY Prosecutor’s
case that struck some Serbian observers as overly politicized. An example of the latter is the
testimony of Wesley Clark, formerly Supreme Commander of NATO, in December 2003.
Describing perceptions of Clark’s testimony in Serbia, journalist Filip Svarm said: “He was
a political figure, so it was hard for Serbians to believe he knew anything concrete about war
crimes, and he’s not perceived favorably in Serbia. So the Serbian public asked, what is he
doing here?”566 Yet Clark’s testimony was highly relevant to key elements of the Prosecutor’s
case against Milošević.
For example, General Clark testified about conversations he had had with Milošević in
which the latter clearly implied that he had foreseen the Srebrenica massacre,567 other encounters in which Milošević claimed to exercise considerable control over the Bosnian Serbs who
carried out that atrocity and others,568 and conversations establishing that Milošević knew
about other atrocities when he was in a position to stop them.569 This testimony went to some
of the core challenges facing the Prosecutor in respect of the charges against Milošević.
As many of our Serbian interlocutors recognize, there is an inherent, inescapably political dimension to the operation of an international court, and perceptions of politicization are
inevitably compounded when the defendant is a former president. Moreover, as journalist
Ljiljana Smajlović notes, “the public isn’t impartial. Everyone hears what they want to hear.”570
When, as in the case of General Clark’s testimony, evidence that is legally crucial risks undermining perceptions of an international court’s legitimacy, problems in perception may be
best addressed through public information strategies. The fact that even some independent
Serbian observers see a problem in Clark’s testimony highlights the importance here, as in
other aspects of the ICTY’s work, of keeping constantly in mind the impact of proceedings on
core audiences as trial and public information strategies are developed.
(iv) Mediating the Message of the Milošević Trial
Not all of the problems associated with the Milošević trial can be attributed to decisions and
actions taken in The Hague. As in other areas of the Tribunal’s work, Serbian perceptions of
the Milošević trial were shaped in large measure by local actors. Those who played a particu-
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larly important role were either hostile to the ICTY or unable effectively to use the trial as a
vehicle for educating the public about evidence adduced in court.
During the crucial initial days of the trial, political leaders in Serbia provided a local
megaphone for Milošević’s anti-Hague courtroom bombast. The Prosecutor had barely concluded her opening statement in Milošević’s trial before she was denounced by then President (later Prime Minister) Vojislav Koštunica. As reported by BBC, Koštunica had this to say
about Del Ponte’s opening statement: “By referring to historical events in the early twentieth
century, she appeared to contradict her own statement that individuals and not the Serbian
nation were on trial.”571 As for “the prosecution’s claim that this trial is against one person,
not all Serbs, that there is no collective guilt but only individual,” Koštunica commented, this
“sounds extremely stretched.”572
By virtually all accounts, the independent Serbian media did not effectively counter
anti-ICTY interpretations—including misinterpretations—of the Milošević trial. In the case of
the independent television station B92, this represented a failure to achieve what it set out to
accomplish. Believing that broadcasts of the trial of Milošević would “show what he did” and,
more generally, enable Serbians “to see what happened,”573 B92 broadcast the trial live, with
special funding from sources that included the ICTY. “But,” as a reporter for B92 recounts,
“that’s not what happened.”574 Instead, “that case started very bad”575 from the viewpoint of
Serbians and others who had hoped the trial would educate Serbians about crimes attributable to their former leader, and the broadcasts, particularly at the outset of the trial, “had the
completely opposite effect” of what B92 had expected.576
Treating the trial as though it were a sports competition—as Filip Svarm noted, “the
trial was watched as you watch two football teams”577—the Serbian media in general tended
to cover it in terms of which side performed better. (Most found Milošević more impressive
than the prosecution.) Even commentators who appeared on B92 reportedly tended to follow
this approach—as one observer put it, “glorifying [Milošević’s] skills”578—when, in the view
of Serbians who support the ICTY, what was badly needed was experts who could explain the
legal significance of evidence and procedures.579
c)

“Then you had this tragic ending”580

For a variety of reasons, including frequent adjournments due to the defendant’s poor health
and the large number of charges against him581 as well as “mismanagement of the judges ...
who failed to control the trial and the defendant,”582 the Milošević trial stretched on for four
years—twice the time initially forecast.583 Along with many observers outside of Serbia, Serbians believe that the “efficiency [of the ICTY] was quite bad; the trial lasted forever.”584 But
Serbians who support the ICTY hoped that the often vexed effort would be redeemed by the
Tribunal’s final judgment.
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As previously noted, many Serbians who believe their country must support and undertake a full reckoning for Milošević-era crimes saw the former leader’s trial as a lynchpin of
those efforts. By persuasively proving that state institutions were integrally involved in the
carnage that raged across the Balkans in the 1990s, the Milošević trial would, they hoped, do
more than any other ICTY case to dispel the culture of denial and impunity in Serbia. “This
trial,” Ana Miljanić notes, “was supposed to be a major pillar of the ICTY’s work.”585
Against these expectations, many Serbians believe that Milošević’s death—coming just
weeks before his marathon trial was to end586—“was disastrous for the Tribunal. Absolutely
disastrous: It didn’t finish the job.”587 Pollster Srd−jan Bogosavljević captured the implications
of Milošević’s death this way: “Because of Milošević’s death, his trial did not have a ‘wow
effect’. He’s dead, and he was not guilty. Had he been found guilty, we’d be able to get rid of
this bad stuff and move toward cooperation with the European Union.”588
Filip Svarm and others described the implications of Milošević’s demise before judgment as a severe blow to the ICTY itself. With Milošević dead, Svarm said, the ICTY is “without
Hamlet.” That is, there is “a performance but no main role.”589 Attorney Ivan Janković invoked
another theater metaphor to make a similar point. Noting that Milošević’s death came at a
time when the ICTY had begun to wrap up its work, he continued: “It’s how you go offstage.
This is probably the wimpiest way you can imagine.”590
In Svarm’s opinion, Milošević’s death without judgment means that in the future, “people will talk about Milošević as a politician” rather than as a convicted war criminal. Had there
been a judgment, Svarm adds, that too “would have been seen politically”—that is, through a
political lens. “But [Milošević] would have been convicted and with the passage of time it would
have been clearer why he was tried.... Every judgment has its clarification, which would give
answers to many questions.... Now we have no judgment. Lawyers won’t be able to talk about
Milošević but politicians will.”591
Janković describes what was lost in terms of legal principles and justice. Noting correctly that Milošević was the only high-ranking Serbian official charged before the ICTY with
criminal responsibility for genocide in relation to the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, Janković said
that the only way to establish a legal link between the Srebrenica genocide and Serbian state
institutions was through the conviction of “high [Serbian] officials.”592 Presciently, Janković
observed that the outcome of the genocide case brought against Serbia by Bosnia-Herzegovina
before the International Court of Justice—then still pending but subsequently decided—would
turn upon establishing this link. Without the possibility of convicting Milošević, he noted, “this
important brick in the [ICJ] genocide case is lost.”593 In short, a judgment in the Milošević
trial provided the indispensable foundation for a full legal reckoning for the worst atrocity in
Europe since World War II. His death forever cheated history of that reckoning.
That Milošević died on the ICTY’s watch is seen by many Serbians as further undermining the Tribunal’s credibility,594 particularly since the ICTY had denied his request for medical
treatment outside of The Netherlands not long before he died.595 Even if the public as a whole
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rejected the claims of Milošević’s family and other supporters that the ICTY was responsible
for his death,596 “people felt that the ICTY hadn’t protected him.”597 Perhaps more important
for those who fundamentally support the process of accountability under way in The Hague,
there is a pervasive sense that if the ICTY had operated more efficiently, Milošević might have
lived to face judgment.598
As some of the previous observations make clear, those who feel cheated by Milošević’s
death implicitly place considerable confidence in the persuasive power of an ICTY judgment.
Notably, they believe that a conviction would have changed the minds of many Serbians previously disposed to deny the legitimacy of the ICTY, even if others were sure to dismiss any
verdict of guilt as the work of a political institution.
Of course the long-term impact of Milošević’s death may prove less damaging than its
short-term impact. In the view of Vojin Dimitrijević, “when things settle down, the impact
of Milošević’s death will be very small indeed.”599 Others believe that the harm caused by his
death can be redeemed, but whether this happens depends on how the ICTY completes its
work in the cases that lie ahead and on initiatives outside the court to redeem the Milošević
case itself.
The Youth Initiative for Human Rights, the Humanitarian Law Center and other organizations have explored ways of retrieving for history the wealth of evidence—much of it uncontroverted—that was introduced into evidence during the trial of Milošević. Just as historians
have mined evidence introduced at Nuremberg, they hope that the evidence introduced in the
Milošević trial will become a wellspring of historical insight about war crimes committed at
the instigation of the Milošević regime. Through, perhaps, an interactive exhibit that begins in
Belgrade and then travels throughout the region, those planning this initiative hope to “break
the continuity of ethnic interpretation” of the 1990s conflicts.600

D. Perceived Imbalance in the ICTY’s Indictments
and Sentences
At the heart of the ICTY’s uneasy relationship with Serbs is what sometimes seems an insolvable paradox. Convinced that the ICTY was established to punish Serbs, many Serbs find
confirmation in the fact that most of the suspects indicted by the ICTY Prosecutor have been
Serbs. As analyst Sonja Stojanović notes, “Here, mathematics are important: How many Serbs
have been punished? What were their sentences?” (Although a majority of the Serbs indicted
by the ICTY have been Bosnian Serbs, Serbian Serbs draw no distinction for purposes of
assessing ICTY impartiality.)
ICTY prosecutors respond (and independent monitoring organizations agree) that the
reason why a majority of indictees have been Serbs is that they committed proportionately
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more serious atrocities during the 1990s conflicts in the Balkans—a position that many Serbs
cite as further proof of ICTY bias. In this setting, relatively recent developments in two ICTY
cases involving crimes committed against Serbs have reinforced Serbian perceptions of antiSerb bias.

1.

Orić Verdict; Other Sentences Imposed on Non-Serb Defendants

One is the two-year sentence rendered on June 30, 2006 against Naser Orić, one of only ten
Bosniaks charged by the ICTY Prosecutor. Orić, who had commanded the Srebrenica Territorial Defense, was found guilty of failing to prevent murders and cruel treatment of Serb
detainees in late 1992 and early 1993 and was acquitted of other charges.
Because Orić had already spent three years in detention—one year longer than his
two-year sentence—he was released immediately, leading some inaccurately to think that he
had been wholly exonerated. Regrettably, the Bosniak chairman of the Bosnian Presidency
reinforced that perception, publicly welcoming the verdict as a vindication. “Now it can clearly
be seen who was defending unarmed civilians and who was committing crimes,” Sulejman
Tihić proclaimed.601 Serbia’s President, Boris Tadić, had a different response: “Shoplifters get
two years in prison,” he noted, “and it is absolutely scandalous that someone who committed
a war crime should get such a lean sentence.”602
Inside the Tribunal, officials believed they could say little to mitigate this interpretation until the judicial process had run its course—that is, until Orić’s appeal is complete. In
the meantime, a member of the Prosecutor’s staff told us, the moment when a controversial
judgment is announced by a Trial Chamber is “exactly the point where we are stuck. We
hear this as kind of the street which has no end.... We cannot argue anything before the final
judgment.”603 A current and former ICTY prosecutor have, however, observed that Orić’s “sentence is unlikely to combat Serb allegations that the ICTY is anti-Serb, and it is at least arguable that such a low sentence will frustrate, as much as it will assist, reconciliation between
Muslims and Serbs.”604
This was not the first time the ICTY had imposed low sentences on Bosniak defendants after convicting them of war crimes.605 On March 15, 2006, an ICTY Trial Chamber
acquitted two Bosnian Army commanders, Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura, of most
of the charges against them and imposed sentences of five years and two and one-half years
respectively for failing to prevent war crimes committed against Croatian and Serb civilians
in Central Bosnia. (On appeal, Hadžihasanović’s sentence was reduced to three and one-half
years’ imprisonment, while Kubura’s was reduced to two years.606)
The then-recent judgment of Orić came up repeatedly in our interviews in Serbia in
November 2006. Describing local reactions, Radmila Nakarada said that for those already critical of the ICTY, “this was the last straw.”607 War Crimes Prosecutor Vladimir Vukčević cites the
Orić sentence as an illustration of the “very poor, amateur-like ... estimations” of the ICTY.608
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2. Haradinaj Case
It would be difficult to exaggerate Serbians’ criticism of the ICTY’s handling of the case against
Ramush Haradinaj, who along with two other commanders of the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) was prosecuted on charges relating to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against Serbs and others in Kosovo during 1999. In its verdict of April 3, 2008, the
ICTY Trial Chamber acquitted Haradinaj and one of his two co-defendants of all charges;
the third was convicted and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment.609 While the verdict drew
strong protests in Serbia, the ICTY’s treatment of Haradinaj before trial had already provoked
deep resentment.
Haradinaj, who became the Prime Minister of Kosovo Albanians after the 1999 NATO
intervention, was—like many ICTY indictees—granted provisional release until his trial began,
but reportedly “is the only indicted person that the [ICTY] has released in order to return to
active politics.”610 Although Haradinaj was at first permitted “only limited work within his own
party,”611 in October 2005 an ICTY Trial Chamber lifted the initial ban on public political activities, instead authorizing the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)—which saw Haradinaj as a key
partner in efforts to reconcile Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo—to allow or reject Haradinaj’s
proposed activities on a case-by-case basis:
... the Accused may appear in public and engage in public political activities to the extent
which UNMIK finds would be important for a positive development of the political and
security situation in Kosovo, subject to the prior approval by UNMIK of a request by the
Accused regarding each individual activity concerned.
...the Trial Chamber requires UNMIK to assume responsibility to authorise or deny
the Accused’s above-referred activities on a case-by-case basis, and to include any such
activity in the bi-weekly reports submitted to the Trial Chamber pursuant to the Decision on Provisional Release. UNMIK is also required to indicate any such future activity
of the accused in these reports, provided that there is a pending by the accused before
UNMIK.612
“The move to lift the [initial] ban on politics,” Tim Judah reports, was “spearheaded by
the UN mission in Kosovo and supported by diplomats there,” who believed that Haradinaj
could play a constructive role in negotiations over the future status of Kosovo.613
ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte appealed the October 2005 order, arguing that “constantly seeing the accused in the media” would “have a chilling effect on victims and witnesses” and “the very real likelihood” of producing a “very intimidating effect” on them.614 On
March 10, 2007, the ICTY Appeals Chamber modified the Trial Chamber’s order, imposing
further restrictions on UNMIK615 but still allowing Haradinaj to engage in public political
activities while on provisional release in Kosovo.616
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As Tim Judah reported following the October 2005 ruling, the decision to allow Haradinaj to participate in Kosovo politics “harmed the tribunal’s attempts to establish a reputation
for impartiality. Serb leaders have said it has just confirmed their long-held belief that the court
is biased against them.”617 A senior spokesman for President Boris Tadić, who has supported
Serbian cooperation with the ICTY, commented: “We see this as appalling. This unbalanced
approach to indictees of different sides is sending a very wrong message to both Serbs and
Albanians.”618
During interviews in Serbia more than one year later, the controversy had hardly subsided. Notably, it is not just anti-Hague sectors that saw the ICTY’s approach toward Haradinaj
as problematic. Judge Radmila Dragičević-Dičić described the decision to allow Haradinaj to
participate in politics as a “bad decision” that tarnished the reputation of the ICTY and played
into the hands of “black powers.”619 Nataša Kandić, who may be the ICTY’s most staunch supporter in Serbia, noted that “[i]t’s very difficult to explain why [Haradinaj] is allowed to speak
in public.”620 Human rights activist Andrej Nosov agrees with others that the Tribunal’s treatment of Haradinaj is “very bad” for the Tribunal and adds that it reflects a complete failure to
understand the impact of its decisions in the region.621
That the decision emanated from political bodies and diplomats exacerbated many
Serbians’ perception that the ICTY is politicized as well as partial. As journalist Ljiljana
Smajlović noted, when Serbians saw Haradinaj giving television interviews because the Tribunal accepted arguments that he could help resolve the Kosovo situation, “this is reminiscent
of the Milošević case. One year he’s a butcher. Then he’s a peacemaker. Then he’s the butcher
of the Balkans.”622
Human rights lawyer Bogdan Ivanišević, too, believes that the ICTY mishandled the
Haradinaj case both for reasons already noted and because of the impact of Haradinaj’s
provisional release on witnesses. In his view, the Tribunal “acted irresponsibly by allowing
Haradinaj to engage in political activities while on provisional release, not only because of
the foreseeable reactions in Serbia, but also because such gesture of respect vis-à-vis Haradinaj could not but discourage those (potential witnesses) in Kosovo who otherwise would
have dared to testify against him.”623 The decision to authorize provisional release, Ivanišević
believes, “should not have been made, or should have been revoked, if the Tribunal knew—as
it must have known—that individuals linked to the case perished, even if it was not possible
for the tribunal to obtain firm evidence that Haradinaj was behind the killings.”624
During the trial of Haradinaj and his two co-defendants, which began on March 5, 2007,
the Trial Chamber (in its words) “encountered significant difficulties in securing the testimony
of a large number of ... witnesses. Many cited fear as a prominent reason for not wishing ... to
give evidence.”625 From the outset of the trial, the prosecution had expressed concerns about
the effect of witness intimidation on its ability to prove its charges against the accused.626
The acquittal of Haradinaj and one of his co-defendants on April 3, 2008—a result that
may have been attributable in part to witnesses’ fear of providing testimony627—drew passion-
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ate denunciations from Serbian officials.628 Prime Minister Koštunica condemned the judgment as a “dark decision,” which showed that the ICTY “does not exist to mete out justice.”629
Deputy Prime Minister Bozidar Djelić called the acquittal “scandalous” and a “black day for
international justice,” while Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor Vladimir Vukčević said the ruling
“shows that it is high time that this tribunal closes down.”630
Coming on top of the November 2005 acquittal of another KLA commander, Fatmir
Limaj, and one of his co-defendants as well as the Orić verdict, the Trial Judgment in Haradinaj
exacerbated Serbian perceptions of the ICTY as a Tribunal that either does not wish, or has not
adequately attempted, to address crimes against ethnic Serbs effectively. Noting that “[m]ost
critiques in Serbia of [the] ICTY are unwarranted,” human rights lawyer Bogdan Ivanišević
nonetheless believes that this criticism “is one of the few points on which [Serbian critics]
may be partially right.”631 Echoing concerns voiced by several other sources who are generally
sympathetic to the ICTY, Ivanišević explained:
If one takes all fifteen years [of the ICTY’s existence] in consideration, it would probably
be possible to demonstrate that the Office of the Prosecutor [(OTP)] has invested more
energy, and activated more able staff, in investigations concerning crimes committed
by Serbs, than in investigations concerning crimes against Serbs. ([Former Croatian
President Franjo] Tudjman, for example, should have been seriously investigated during his life, but he was not). I suppose this lack of equal commitment on the part of
the OTP is understandable—just as it would have been understandable, after WWII, if
a neutral (non-Nuremberg) prosecutor had felt greater urgency to focus on Nazi crimes
than on crimes committed against Germans. But still, the (Hague) Prosecutor should
have known better than that.632

E. Lengthy Pre-Trial Detention and Trials
The ICTY’s reputation in Serbia is further tarnished by the extraordinarily long periods that
some indictees have had to wait for trial, often but by no means always in detention, once
the Tribunal obtains custody of them—a period often followed by long trials. Many Serbians
can readily tick off how long some high-profile defendants had to await trial once the ICTY
obtained custody of them: Bosnian Serb leader Momčilo Krajišnik awaited trial for almost
four years after his arrest and his trial lasted over two years;633 the trial of Serbian Radical
Party leader Vojislav Šešelj began more than four and a half years after his surrender;634 while
former Serbian President Milan Milutinović waited for three and one-half years for his trial
to begin after he surrendered.635
In the view of Belgrade District Court Judge Radmila Dragičević-Dičić, this not only creates the impression that the ICTY “is not so effective” and “gives the picture that they didn’t
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prepare things” but is “against all international standards” and “gives ammunition to the antiHague” lobby.636 Judge Siniša Važić, President of the Belgrade District Court, agrees, noting
that the “small efficiency of the ICTY” represented by “defendants waiting too long” for trial
“allows the other guys [i.e., anti-Hague nationalists] to say yes, they were waiting four years to
come to trial.”637 This, he believes, is important to the Serbian public.638
Expressing a similar view, journalist Antonela Riha added: “Even peasants know it’s not
good if the trial lasts so long.”639 Another journalist, Filip Svarm, believes that the passage of
years before even a notorious war criminal like Bosnian Serb leader Momčilo Krajišnik comes
to trial undermines the ICTY’s educative role: “The public has forgotten” who he was by the
time his case comes to trial.640
When the defendant is a well-known Serbian political figure, the effect may be quite the
opposite—yet still harmful. Svarm believes that the fact that Serbian nationalist Vojislav Šešelj
spent over four years in pre-trial detention “enabled the Serbian Radical Party to claim he’s a
hero, a victim of a pro-American court.” Noting that there were other reasons why the Radical party was the largest vote-getter in then-recent elections, Svarm nonetheless believes that
Šešelj’s lengthy detention without trial contributed to its popularity. “Had he been tried and convicted,” Svarm believes, “the popularity of the Serbian Radical Party would have declined.”641
ICTY officials recognize that the length of time some defendants have spent awaiting
and in trial has been a problem for which the Tribunal bears at least partial responsibility (as
former ICTY prosecutor Alex Whiting notes, however, “sometimes defendants also contribute
to delays.”642) The Tribunal has taken various measures to address this problem, though ICTY
officials have different perspectives on which factors are key. Some judges believe the problem
lies in the large number of charges advanced by the Prosecutor. On several occasions beginning in 1999, the judges have amended the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence to
establish a growing repertoire of tools to curb the length of trials, such as limiting the number
of witnesses the Prosecutor can present and/or the time available for presenting evidence and
inviting the Prosecutor to reduce the number of counts in indictments.643
In the view of David Tolbert, who served as Deputy Prosecutor from August 2004
through March 2008, a confluence of factors has contributed to lengthy trials. A key factor,
in his opinion, has been the Tribunal’s lack of an effective pre-trial management process.
“What you hope for in complex litigation,” Tolbert notes, “is to narrow the issues before trial.
The parties have to be herded into agreeing on certain facts and on witness lists with the end
of reducing time in court.”644 This has not happened to the extent possible or desirable—in
part because the defense “refuses to make any agreement to narrow the issues,” says another
former ICTY prosecutor.645 A second factor, he believes, is that the presiding judges have often
lacked previous courtroom experience (those judges were appointed because of their expertise
in international law).
The poor qualifications of many defense counsel—particularly from the Balkans and
especially during the ICTY’s early years—also slowed down trial proceedings, in Tolbert’s view.
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“Some didn’t know how to conduct a cross-examination,” he recalled, “or how to negotiate a
guilty plea,” and in at least one early case “this delayed the whole process.”646
Poor management within the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has contributed to avoidable delays, and Tolbert readily acknowledges this. “Part of the problem,” he reflected, “is that
lawyers tend to be poor managers.”647 The OTP’s trial attorneys “weren’t hired for their managerial skills.”648 For the first half of the ICTY’s life, moreover, investigations were driven by
investigators rather than by senior trial attorneys, an approach that did not produce the most
efficient preparation for trials. Tribunal insiders are aware, moreover, that while the ICTY has
benefited from some extraordinary leadership and trial attorneys, key senior staff positions
have not always been filled by well qualified individuals.
Tolbert noted another factor that contributed to Tribunal backlogs: For the first eight
years of its institutional life, the ICTY “was limping along with few cases. Then, in 2001
there was a deluge.”649 The ICTY was slow to adapt to the sudden explosion of indictees in
custody, and the “poor management system” that had been put in place earlier was the one
that absorbed indictees now being transferred to The Hague.650 Former ICTY Prosecutor Alex
Whiting agrees, calling this a “huge factor. When the deluge hit, the prosecution fell into
emergency-room mode,” focusing on cases “that were imminently going to trial” and lacking
resources to catch up with its new and mounting backlog of cases awaiting trial.651
Of course, and as other prosecutors noted,652 the inherent complexity of cases brought
before an international war crimes tribunal inevitably makes for a more extensive trial process
than one would find in, say, a typical murder trial. To recognize this, however, is not to absolve
the ICTY of responsibility for managing the resulting challenges as effectively as possible.

F. Concluding Observations
Despite the shortcomings this chapter has touched upon, the ICTY has been widely
praised and rightly so for providing fair trials under formidably challenging conditions.653
At least among the intelligentsia in Serbia, even critical observers have been struck by the
Tribunal’s scrupulous regard for fair process. In the future, this may enable the ICTY’s
judgments to provide a solid foundation for broader public acceptance of facts that are
still contested.
Yet shortcomings that flow from avoidable patterns, such as overly long pre-trial detention and trials, have needlessly compounded the ICTY’s challenges in Serbia. The Tribunal’s
credibility has suffered further when its prosecutors and judges evince an unacceptably poor
grasp of the region whose crimes they have judged and prosecuted for one and a half decades—
a weakness reflected not only during trials, but at times also in the Prosecutor’s selection of
defendants and charges. Even when it performs well, moreover, the Tribunal’s work can be and
has been manipulated beyond fair recognition by nationalist leaders—a dynamic the Tribunal
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thoroughly failed to address in its early years, and which the Tribunal could still address more
effectively than it has to date.
To be sure, and as judges whom we interviewed in The Hague emphasized, there is an
inherent tension between a court’s awareness of its local audience on the one hand and its
institutional imperative to focus on doing justice in the specific case before it. As ICTY President Fausto Pocar observed, when judging a particular defendant the Tribunal’s imperative is
to apply and be guided by “neutral principles of justice. We shouldn’t have a second agenda,”
such as considering how or whether this judgment “may help or not help reconciliation.”654
By equal measure, however, even neutral justice dispensed 2000 kilometers from the scene
of atrocious crimes does not speak for itself. If the Tribunal does not make adequate efforts
to ensure that its work is understood, others can more readily fill the void and distort its
record.

88

P E R F O R M A N C E - R E L AT E D F A C T O R S

Acknowledgments
This report was written by Diane Orentlicher, special counsel to the Open Society Justice Initiative during 2007–08. This report draws upon a wide range of sources, which are identified
throughout the report, including interviews conducted in Serbia during two visits by Diane
Orentlicher in November 2006 and June 2007 while on sabbatical leave from the Washington
College of Law of American University.655
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arrest, this was “[m]ore than just the closing of a chapter of bloody history[;] it is a signal about the
future. The newly formed government in Belgrade is demonstrating that it is serious about bringing
Serbia into the European fold.” Laura Silber, “Serbia’s arresting development,” Los Angeles Times
(opinion piece), July 23, 2008.

91

8.
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42. For example the 1999 military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to end
Serbian repression of Kosovar Albanians may have served as a more potent deterrent to further
atrocities than the work of the ICTY.
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7, 2007.
90. Interview with Srd−an Bogosavljević, Belgrade, November 21, 2006.
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judgment of the International Court of Justice. Case Concerning the Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro), Judgment, 448, 465, 471(6), February 26, 2007.
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Interview with Nataša Kandić, Belgrade, November 27, 2006.

132. See Ian Fisher, “Opinion Is Divided in Serbia Over Handover of Milošević,” New York Times,
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143. See Tanja Nicolić-Djaković, “We Are Still Hostages of Secret Services,” Blic, April 15, 2007,
reported by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, April 19, 2007; “Belgrade daily slams State Security,” RTV
B92 News (Belgrade), October 10, 2006 (summarizing Blic report).
144. According to a report of the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center published in late
2006, “parts of police and military security agencies, loyal to the former ideology that endorsement
of Hague indictees is in Serbia’s national interest, play a major role among those who protect the
ICTY indictees.” Humanitarian Law Center, “Political elites in Serbia show no responsibility for
legacy of the past,” December 11, 2006.
145. Laura Silber, “Serbia Loses More than a Leader” (opinion piece), New York Times, March 14,
2003.
146. Some articles use the last name “Luković” instead of Ulemek.
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228. Interview with Ana Miljanić, Belgrade, November 22, 2006.
229. Id.
230. Humanitarian Law Center, “Transitional Justice Report: Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo,
1999–2005,” p. 6. The organization links Serbia’s cooperation with the Hague Tribunal in the form
of arresting indictees to the “building of Serbia’s democratic future based on respect for the Law
and human rights.” Humanitarian Law Center, “Political elites in Serbia show no responsibility for
legacy of the past,” December 11, 2006.
231. See Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Belgrade Centre for Human
Rights and Strategic Marketing Research, “Public Opinion in Serbia: Views on Domestic War
Crimes Judicial Authorities and the Hague Tribunal,” p. 56, December 2006.
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251. Interview with Radmila Nakarada, Belgrade, November 24, 2006.
252. Interview with Antonela Riha, Belgrade, November 27, 2006.
253. Id.
254. Interview with Ana Miljanić, Belgrade, November 22, 2006.
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Berkeley Journal of International Law 165 (2004).
267. Interview with Vladimir Vukčević, Belgrade, November 21, 2006.
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269. Interview with Nataša Kandić, Belgrade, November 27, 2006. Journalist Antonela Riha
made the point this way: “That’s the main impact of The Hague. If it didn’t exist, there would be
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276. Interview with Dušan Protić, Belgrade, November 23, 2006.
277. Interview with Ivan Jovanović, Belgrade, November 22, 2006.
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298. On November 17, 2006, a referral bench of the ICTY rendered a decision to transfer to
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Dubrovnik in 1991. See Prosecutor v. Vladimir Kovačević, Case No. IT-01-42/2-I, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11bis, November 17, 2006. Because of his mental condition, Kovačević
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Interview with Nataša Kandić, November 27, 2006.
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the Current—War Crimes Prosecutions in Serbia, pp. 10–11 (2007), International Center for Transitional Justice; Humanitarian Law Center Press Release, “HLC on War Crimes Trials in Serbia,”
July 26, 2006. In the view of the Humanitarian Law Center’s executive director, Nataša Kandić, one
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have affected the outcome. See Marlise Simons, “Genocide Court Ruled for Serbia without Seeing
Full War Archive,” New York Times, April 9, 2007.
344. This represented a decrease from the two preceding years. See Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe, Belgrade Centre for Human Rights and Strategic Marketing Research,
“Public Opinion in Serbia: Views on Domestic War Crimes Judicial Authorities and the Hague
Tribunal,” p. 51, December 2006.
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348. The accused in several cases include three mid-level officers—an assistant commander of
the Serbian gendarmerie; a deputy gendarmerie commander, and the commander of the Scorpions,

SHRINKING THE SPACE FOR DENIAL

115

an “elite unit of the Serbian special police.” Bogdan Ivanišević, “Against the Current—War Crimes
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393. Interview with Nataša Kandić, Belgrade, November 27, 2006. Opinions to this effect among
our Serbian interlocutors are borne out by public opinion surveys conducted in recent years. In
2004, 2005, and 2006, a fairly constant majority ranging from 69 percent to 71 percent of respondents said that it is better to conduct war crimes trials in Serbia than in The Hague. See Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Belgrade Center for Human Rights and Strategic
Marketing Research, “Public Opinion in Serbia: Views on Domestic War Crimes Judicial Authorities
and the Hague Tribunal,” p. 49 (December 2006).
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November 28, 2006.
438. Interview with Srd−an Bogosavljević, Belgrade, November 21, 2006.
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490. Interview with Goran Svilanović, Belgrade, November 20, 2006.
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530. The prosecution called Bakalli as a witness, according to the New York Times, “because he
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534. “Milošević on trial,” The Economist, February 15, 2002.
535. Ian Fisher and Marlise Simons, “Defiant, Milošević Begins His Defense by Assailing NATO;
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591. Interview with Filip Svarm, Belgrade, November 24, 2006.
592. Interview with Ivan Janković, Belgrade, November 24, 2006.
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in a Drug Ploy; Serb Leader May Have Sought to Fake Illness,” New York Times, March 14, 2006.
596. See Molly Moore and Daniel Williams, “Milošević Found Dead in Prison; Genocide Trial Is
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620. Interview with Nataša Kandić, Belgrade, November 27, 2006.
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Fifteen years ago the United Nations Security
Council launched the contemporary era of
war crimes tribunals by establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). At the time, ethnic violence
was in full rage in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
the Security Council’s action struck many as
desperate, ad hoc and inadequate. Yet despite
its inauspicious origin, the ICTY inspired
widespread hope and commitment among
those who believed it could partially redeem
the world’s failure to prevent ethnic carnage
in Europe’s heart.
The Open Society Justice Initiative believes
it important that those involved in the
work of international tribunals—whether as
practitioners, donors, policy-makers or in other
capacities—develop a greater understanding
of the impact contemporary war crimes
tribunals have had in the regions directly
affected by their work. We hope that this
report contributes useful insights in this
regard and helps stimulate further inquiries
into the impact of international tribunals in
the countries most affected by their work.
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